The Wholesale Decommissioning of Vacant Urban Neighborhoods: Smart Decline, Public-Purpose Takings, and the Legality of Shrinking Cities by Beckman, Ben
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2010
The Wholesale Decommissioning of Vacant Urban
Neighborhoods: Smart Decline, Public-Purpose
Takings, and the Legality of Shrinking Cities
Ben Beckman
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, The Wholesale Decommissioning of Vacant Urban Neighborhoods: Smart Decline, Public-Purpose Takings, and the Legality of
Shrinking Cities, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 387 (2010)
 387 
THE WHOLESALE DECOMMISSIONING OF 
VACANT URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS: SMART 
DECLINE, PUBLIC-PURPOSE TAKINGS, AND THE 
LEGALITY OF SHRINKING CITIES 
BEN BECKMAN* 
 I.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 389 
 II.  WHOLESALE DECOMMISSIONING AND RESPONSIBLE URBAN  
  LAND-USE STRATEGY ......................................................... 393 
A.  The Emergence of the Urban Fiscal Mismatch ........... 394 
B.  Smart Decline Helps Rectify the Fiscal Mismatch  
 Confronting Vacating Cities........................................ 396 
C.  Eminent Domain and the Case for Shrinking Vacant  
 Cities............................................................................ 397 
D.  Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Legitimacy of  
 Condemnations ............................................................ 400 
 III.  PUBLIC-PURPOSE TAKINGS AND THE LEGALITY OF SHRINKING  
  CITIES .................................................................................. 403 
A.  Public-Purpose Takings Are Consistent with American  
 Positive Law ................................................................ 403 
1.  Plain Meaning and Property Rights...................... 403 
2.  Public-Purpose Takings and Supreme Court  
 Precedent .............................................................. 406 
a.   The Supreme Court and the Promotion of  
 Economic Growth.......................................... 406 
i.  The Court’s Incorporation Blunder ............ 407 
ii. Judicial Equation of Public Purpose and  
     Public Use.................................................. 409 
b.   A New Role for the Court—Economic  
 Regulation ..................................................... 411 
c.  Promoting Economic Growth and the Resulting  
 Judicial Conundrum...................................... 415 
                                                          
 *
 J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (expected May 2010).  I welcome all 
comments at beckman12@gmail.com.  This Note benefited immensely from comments by 
Professor Alan Weinstein and Professor Christopher Sagers.  Professor Kunal G. Parker 
provided an engaging exploration of the topics in American intellectual history that appear in 
the paper.  The deft editorial guidance of Margaret Sweeney and Emily White Kirsch was an 
immeasurable aid.  I fleshed out the piece’s central idea in several extremely helpful 
conversations with my good friend and classmate, Ed Herman.  Lastly, this paper owes a great 
debt to my enduringly patient wife, Alison Day.  Thank you all.  All mistakes are mine alone. 
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
388 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:387 
 
B.  Natural Law Permits Public-Purpose Takings............ 417 
1.  Property Rights and Democratic Citizenship ....... 418 
a.  Property and Civic Identity ........................... 418 
b.  Locke, Political Legitimacy, and Property ... 420 
c.  American Republicanism in the Absence of a  
 Landed Gentry............................................... 421 
2.  Property Rights, Natural Rights, and Natural Law .. 423 
3.  Property Rights and the Rule of Law ................... 425 
C.  The American Tradition Should Not Prevent Smart- 
 Decline Takings ........................................................... 426 
D.  Public-Purpose Takings—The Public-Policy Concerns.. 429 
1.  Procedure-Focused Policy Objections.................. 429 
2.  Benefit-Focused Policy Objections ...................... 433 
3.  Cost-Focused Policy Objections .......................... 438 
 IV.  SMART DECLINE, JUST COMPENSATION, AND KALDOR-HICKS  
  EFFICIENCY.......................................................................... 440 
A.  Public Use, Judicial Competence, and a Proposed  
 Solution........................................................................ 440 
B.  The Political Utility of Smart-Decline Takings ........... 445 
C.  Identification and Resolution of the Dispositive Legal  
 Issues ........................................................................... 450 
1.  Fair Remuneration for the Property Owner.......... 450 
2.  A Legitimate Boon to Society .............................. 455 
 V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 459 
 
Rather than a permanent construction, one must take American urbanism as an 
essentially temporary, provisional, and continuously revised articulation of property 
ownership, speculative development, and mobile capital. 
—Architects Charles Waldheim and Marilí Santos-Munné1 
 
Forget what you think you know about this place.  Detroit is the most relevant 
city in the United States for the simple reason that it is the most unequivocally 
modern and therefore distinctive of our national culture: in other words, a total 
success. . . . This makes Detroit the revealed “Capital of the Twentieth Century,” 
and likely the century ahead. 
—Wayne State University Professor Jerry Herron2 
 
If they stay where they are I absolutely cannot give them all the services they 
require. 
                                                          
 
1
 Charles Waldheim & Marilí Santos-Munné, Decamping Detroit, in STALKING DETROIT 
104, 108 (George Daskalakis et. al. eds. 2001). 
 
2
 Jerry Herron, Three Meditations on the Ruins of Detroit, in STALKING DETROIT, supra 
note 1, at 33, 33.  
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—Detroit Mayor Dave Bing3 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Detroit has lost nearly one million residents since 1950,4 and over one-third of its 
residential parcels languish unoccupied.5  Mayor Dave Bing has publicly declared 
his intent to relocate residents from the most woefully vacant areas so that the city 
can direct its infrastructure and service investments to more-viable neighborhoods.6  
Should the law permit fiscally stressed cities like Detroit to shut down obsolete 
neighborhoods by compelling their citizens to move? 
In a word, yes.  When population density plummets and the available tax base 
can no longer support the oversized infrastructure of an earlier era, cities owe their 
citizenry a reorganized urban geography.   
An analogy to commercial real estate is helpful.7  Faced with rising vacancy rates 
and falling demand for retail space, smart shopping-mall owners consolidate their 
remaining tenants into adjacent suites and shutter or demolish the vacant portion of 
the property.8  Landlords hope that these measures will align supply with demand 
and promote synergies among the remaining tenants.9  Unlike private landlords, city 
officials typically respond to rising vacancy rates and falling demand for urban real 
estate by raising taxes, cutting back on basic services, or both.  Tax increases are no 
longer an effective option for cities struggling with outmigration-induced10 budget 
                                                          
 
3
 Christine MacDonald, Bing: I’ll Move Some Residents, DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 25, 2010, 
at A4. 
 
4
 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, RANK BY POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST URBAN 
PLACES, LISTED ALPHABETICALLY BY STATE: 1790-1990 (1998), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/ documentation/twps0027/tab01.txt. 
 
5
 John Gallagher, Many Are Gone, But More Remain, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb. 20, 
2010, at A9. 
 
6
 Alex P. Kellogg, Detroit’s Smaller Reality: Mayor Plans to Use Census Tally Showing 
Decline as Benchmark in Overhaul, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2010, at A3; MacDonald, supra 
note 3. 
 
7
 The analogy between the operational context of a shrinking city and the management 
imperatives of a shopping-mall landlord is Rybczynski and Linneman’s.  Witold Rybczynski 
& Peter D. Linneman, How to Save Our Shrinking Cities, 135 PUB. INT. 30, 35-36 (1999) 
[hereinafter Shrinking Cities].   
 
8
 See, e.g., Jesse Tinsley, New Look, Stores Boost Center: Wal-Mart Store Joins the 
Lineup at Severance Mall, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 30, 1999, at B1 (highlighting the 
renaissance of a formerly troubled shopping mall after a substantial demolition and 
reconfiguration). 
 
9
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 35-36; see also Jesse Tinsley, Chain Stores Say Mall 
Isn’t in Their Plans: Future Uncertain for Severance Town Center 3 Years After Anchors Left, 
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Apr. 2, 1997, at A1 (discussing the economic interdependence of 
shopping mall tenants, the detrimental effect of vacancies, and the mall manager’s awareness 
of the issue). 
 
10
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the intransitive verb “outmigrate” to mean “[t]o 
leave one country or place to make one’s home in another.”  OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
1025 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989).  I use “outmigration” in this sense 
but specifically use it to refer to the population exodus from vertical cities—both to those 
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gaps, just as landlords in weak markets cannot sustainably redistribute fixed 
operating costs by raising rents.11  Similarly, service cutbacks exacerbate the exodus 
from central cities in the same way that a nonresponsive landlord drives tenants 
away.  These municipal responses further skew the already troublesome 
supply/demand imbalance in the urban land market, stranding remaining occupants 
in deepening geographic isolation.12 
Accepting that population does not inexorably increase over time, proponents of 
smart decline argue that the scope of government should contract when population 
levels fall.13  Professors Deborah E. Popper and Frank J. Popper define “smart 
decline” as “leaving behind assumptions of growth and finding alternatives to it.”14  
They also state that “smart decline requires thinking about who and what remains.  It 
may entail reorganizing or eliminating some services and providing different ones.  
It may involve promoting certain land uses and landmarks more as historical 
remnants than as sources of growth.”15   
One example of smart decline is the proposal that we shrink central cities that 
exhibit significant vacancy rates.16  Professors Witold Rybczynski and Peter D. 
Linneman argue that the geographic size of older American cities is no longer 
sustainable, given today’s low demand for urban land.17  In cities with significant 
vacancy problems, shrinking the municipal jurisdiction would conserve public 
resources by streamlining service delivery and reducing oversized infrastructure 
systems.18 
                                                          
cities’ suburbs and to the horizontal cities of the demographically growing American South 
and West. 
 
11
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 36;  see also Ebony Reed, East Side Vote Can’t Carry 
School Tax; Pinkney Advises Against Trying for Tax Again in February, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Nov. 6, 2004, at B1 (quoting campaign manager who suspected that earlier police 
and fire department layoffs contributed to defeat of municipal school tax request); Mike 
Tobin, Campbell Plans to Cut 700 Jobs, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 24, 2003, at A1 
(reporting mayoral intent to lay off police, fire, and EMS workers because of falling municipal 
revenues and loss of population); Mike Tobin & Lila J. Mills, Layoff Talk Took Toll on 
Tickets: Some Arrests Fell, Sick Time Soared Before Safety Forces Lost Jobs, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Mar. 7, 2004, at A1 (discussing decline in quality of safety services resulting 
from layoffs in public safety department). 
 
12
 See Olivera Perkins & Tom Breckenridge, Our Shrinking City Looks Down the Road, 
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 19, 2007, at A1 (telling the story of one city block’s only 
remaining resident in a neighborhood that was once a densely populated, mixed use 
community). 
 
13
 See generally Deborah E. Popper & Frank J. Popper, Small Can Be Beautiful, 
PLANNING, July 2002, at 20. 
 
14
 Id. at 21-22.  
 
15
 Id.  
 
16
 See generally Shrinking Cities, supra note 7. 
 
17
 Id. at 31, 34. 
 
18
 Id. at 36-37. 
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The contradiction between smart decline and the American infatuation with 
growth often breeds resistance to the prospect of shrinking our vacant cities.19  For 
instance, despite some observers’ approbation of Mayor Bing’s announcement,20 
cynics have already accused him of bad faith.21  But smart decline has a strong 
internal logic, and a few American cities have preceded Detroit in considering 
municipal contraction as a smart-decline strategy.22  For instance, officials and local 
stakeholders in Youngstown, Ohio have collaboratively developed a plan to shrink 
the urban footprint through voluntary owner relocation and targeted municipal 
investment.23  With any municipal-contraction plan, however, a small number of 
unwilling owners could destroy the projected efficiency gains by refusing to 
relocate.   
Eminent domain is a legitimate last-resort strategy in support of well-conceived 
plans to contract municipal boundaries.  By raising the possibility of eminent 
domain, the proposal that we shrink our cities does more than merely challenge 
                                                          
 
19
 See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Some Voice Concern Over Mayor’s Priorities, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Jan. 24, 2001, at B1 (chronicling criticisms of Philadelphia mayor for spending on 
blight removal rather than emphasizing population growth to increase municipal tax yields); 
Tony Dokoupil, Cutting Down to Size, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 27, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/224646 (describing public castigation of Genesee County 
Treasurer Dan Kildee, a prominent advocate for decommissioning of abandoned buildings 
through land banking); Brentin Mock, Can They Save Youngstown?, NEXT AM. CITY, Fall 
2008, http://americancity.org/magazine/article/ can-they-save-youngstown/. 
 
20
 Editorial, Bing’s Detroit: An End to Illusions, But Room for Hope, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
Mar. 24, 2010, at A8; Editorial, Bing’s Vision, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 24, 2010, at A12; Daniel 
Howes, Bing Sets Sights on 4 Detroit Priorities, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 25, 2010, at B4; 
Kellogg, supra note 6 (quoting Rip Rapson, president of a national foundation active in 
community-development work in Detroit, in support of Mayor Bing); Darren A. Nichols & 
Leonard N. Fleming, Mayor Bing: “Together We Can Reinvent Detroit,” DETROIT NEWS, 
Mar. 24, 2010, at A1 (noting that a majority of the Detroit City Council support the mayor’s 
land-use vision); Rochelle Riley, Detroit Missing a Larger-Than-Life Leader, DETROIT FREE 
PRESS (Mar. 24, 2010), at A2; Thinking About Shrinking: Detroit’s Future, ECONOMIST, Mar. 
27, 2010, at 36. 
 
21
 MacDonald, supra note 3 (quoting Ron Scott, a community activist who contends that 
the mayor is working to provide business interests with large tracts of urban land); David 
Whitford, Postcard: Downsizing Detroit, TIME, Mar. 29, 2010, at 4 (reporting that a Michigan 
newspaper likened Bing’s plan to the removal of the Cherokee nation across the Trail of 
Tears). 
 
22
 See, e.g., Tom Breckenridge, A New Take on Urban Renewal; Plans Build on Anchor 
Projects in 6 Parts of City, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Nov. 25, 2007, at B1 (describing 
targeted community investment in Cleveland); Cynthia Burton, City Spells Out Plan to Take 
Philadelphia Beyond Blight: Demolition of Eyesores, Better Neighborhood Maintenance, and 
Community Involvement Are Part of a $250 Million Effort, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 2, 2000, at 
A1 (describing massive demolition initiative in Philadelphia); Thomas A. Finnerty, Jr., 
Youngstown Embraces Its Future, PLANNING, Aug./Sept. 2003, at 14, 14 (describing planned 
voluntary obsolescence of vacant neighborhoods in Youngstown, Ohio); Carolina Reid, 
Neighborhoods in Bloom: Measuring the Impact of Targeted Community Investments, 
COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS, Winter 2006, at 24, 24 (describing targeted community investment 
in Richmond, Va.). 
 
23
 Finnerty, supra note 22, at 14. 
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American assumptions about growth.24   Such municipal-contraction proposals also 
threaten cherished understandings of property rights, particularly thoughts about the 
sanctity of the home.25  Nonetheless, in appropriate urban contexts, smart decline 
through municipal contraction is good policy, and eminent domain is needed to 
execute it.   
A few words on vocabulary are in order.  In legal discourse, the terms “eminent 
domain,” “condemnation,” “expropriation,” and “compulsory purchase” are 
synonymous.26  “Expropriation” and “compulsory purchase” are primarily used in 
British English, while “eminent domain” and “condemnation” are exclusively 
American phrasings.27  I use all of these synonyms interchangeably.   
“Municipal contraction” means the reduction of the city’s jurisdictional authority 
by “deannexing” portions of its present land area.  In legal discourse, “annexation” 
refers to “[a] formal act by which a nation, state, or municipality incorporates land 
within its dominion.”28  Urban planners and land-use lawyers use “deannexation” as 
its antonym.29 
“Wholesale decommissioning” refers to the geographically targeted 
comprehensive extinguishment of private ownership.  Wholesale decommissioning 
makes municipal contraction possible by enabling the city to relinquish jurisdiction 
over the now-vacant land area.  The phrase intends to evoke an image of the city 
shutting down an entire neighborhood, albeit a virtually empty one.30 
A “smart-decline taking” is an exercise of eminent domain that furthers a 
wholesale-decommissioning strategy.  Professor Frank Michelman has defined a 
“taking” as “constitutional law’s expression for any sort of publicly inflicted private 
injury for which the Constitution requires payment of compensation.”31  This Note is 
principally concerned with those takings that arise from the State’s exercise of 
eminent domain, either directly or through the State’s designee.  To put a finer point 
                                                          
 
24
 For a discussion of the ways in which municipal contraction challenges American 
assumptions about growth, see Popper & Popper, supra note 13, at 21-22 and see also 
Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 40, 43-44. 
 
25
 See D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 295-
300 (2006) (discussing impact of eminent domain in the residential context);  see also 
Supreme Court’s Kelo Decision and Potential Congressional Responses: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 74 (2005) 
[hereinafter H. Hearings] (email from Margaret Cobb, Atlanta, Ga.) (invoking the sanctity of 
the home as a source of comfort in a post-9/11 world). 
 
26
 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 189, 195-96, 312, 342 (2d 
ed. 1995).   
 
27
 Id. 
 
28
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 104 (9th ed. 2009). 
 
29
 See, e.g., Rural Water Dist. No. 4 v. City of Eudora, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1298 passim (D. 
Kan. 2009); Michael B. Kent, Jr., Public Utilities, Eminent Domain, and Local Land Use 
Regulations: Has Texas Found the Proper Balance?, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 29, 35 
(2009); Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 41. 
 
30
 See, e.g., Waldheim & Santos-Munné, supra note 1, at 105. 
 
31
 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol58/iss2/7
2010] THE WHOLESALE DECOMMISSIONING 393 
 
on it, this Note addresses the distinction that property-rights advocates have 
developed to delegitimize certain types of takings.  This distinction divides 
condemnations into disfavored-yet-legitimate takings—the direct-government-use 
and common-carrier takings—and ostensibly illegitimate public-purpose takings.  
The property-rights movement unequivocally places economic-development takings 
in the illegitimate category.  The status of blight-remediation takings is ambiguous 
but tends toward legitimacy.   
In locating smart-decline takings in this landscape, I treat them as a form of 
economic-development taking.  While it is possible that a city might characterize its 
smart-decline takings as blight remediation, this rhetorical move smacks of a cynical 
formalism that exploits—rather than transforms—the ambiguities that riddle current 
American takings law.  Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s very deferential 
decision in Kelo v. City of New London,32 state restrictions on eminent domain will 
provide the principal obstacles to proponents of smart-decline takings.33  In some 
states, legislative action may be needed to remove particularly constricting 
limitations adopted in Kelo’s wake.34  But repeal of overly stringent state restrictions 
on eminent domain will founder without a viable alternate method of preventing 
abuse.  Accordingly, clearing the path for smart-decline takings in some states will 
require a comprehensive solution to the problem of eminent-domain abuse.  The 
ideal solution to that problem is to include reasonable subjective value in just-
compensation awards and to evaluate the public-use requirement using a Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency standard.35  These measures prevent both unjust governmental 
seizure of private property and selfish exploitation of the public fisc by economic-
rent-seeking holdout owners.   
Part II of this Note argues that wholesale decommissioning of declining urban 
neighborhoods, including smart-decline takings, is the appropriate policy response in 
cities that have experienced decimating population losses.  Part III addresses the four 
principal arguments that eminent-domain opponents advance to show that public-
purpose takings—of which smart-decline takings are a variant—are illegal.  These 
arguments involve policy concerns, interpretations of American law, notions of 
natural or universal law, and the role of that set of cultural ideals most aptly 
described as the American tradition.  Part IV explores the ways in which the 
wholesale-decommissioning concept opens new avenues for a lasting resolution of 
the American eminent-domain controversy.  Part V contains some concluding 
reflections, especially regarding the fate of the decommissioned land.   
II. WHOLESALE DECOMMISSIONING AND RESPONSIBLE URBAN LAND-USE STRATEGY 
Over the past sixty years, a persistent mismatch has emerged between falling 
municipal revenues and rising municipal expenses.  Smart-decline policy provides a 
                                                          
 
 
32
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 
33
 John J. Costonis, New Orleans, Katrina and Kelo: American Cities in the Post-Kelo 
Era, 83 TUL. L. REV. 395, 412-20 (2008). 
 
34
 For a discussion of the legal impediments and citations to the relevant state law, see id. 
 
35
 For a fuller discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency and its application to the eminent 
domain controversy, see infra Part II.D. 
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necessary alternative to the failed attempts to resolve this financial conundrum.  In 
particular, municipal contraction through wholesale decommissioning offers the 
most responsible land-use strategy in vacant urban neighborhoods.  To achieve the 
fiscal benefits of this approach, however, municipalities may need to expropriate the 
property of unreasonable holdout landowners. 
A. The Emergence of the Urban Fiscal Mismatch 
Historically, American cities coalesced in response to the scarcity of 
transportation. The physical character of older American cities reflects this now-
outdated principle.  Professors Rybczynski and Linneman have labeled these older 
urban aggregations “vertical cities,” perhaps because of the densely packed multi-
story downtown buildings that the surface-transportation challenge engendered.36  In 
vertical cities, workforce housing is situated close to workplaces and to the retail 
outlets serving the family’s daily needs.  Businesses cluster together in a central 
district to facilitate communication on foot.  Public institutions and cultural assets 
are centrally located and connected to neighborhood districts by arterial 
transportation links, particularly mass transit.37  In contrast, so-called “horizontal 
cities” developed after the automobile provided private ground transportation to the 
broad spectrum of Americans.  Horizontal cities are characterized by automobile-
focused transportation infrastructure, spatial segregation of differing land uses, and 
geographic dispersion of community assets and business activity.38   
In the middle of the twentieth century, cheap automobiles,39 rising wages,40 and 
countervailing government policies41 shattered the spatial imperative that created the 
older vertical cities.  But distasteful urban realities such as racial tension,42 crime,43 
                                                          
 
36
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 33-34. 
 
37
 Id. at 34. 
 
38
 Id. 
 
39
 See, e.g., JON C. TEAFORD, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN CITY 98-99 (2d ed. 
1993) (discussing the meteoric increase in American automobile ownership after 1950 and the 
elimination of the traditional necessity that workers live within walking distance of the 
worksite). 
 
40
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 30 (discussing the decimation of the manufacturing 
capacity of international industrial rivals during the Second World War and America’s 
postwar prosperity). 
 
41
 Federal and state land-use policies supported outmigration by subsidizing the costs of 
suburban real estate developers.  MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR 
COMMUNITY STABILITY 35-46 (1997).  Federal tax policy encouraged sprawl by rewarding 
families for buying rather than renting a home, 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006), and 
encouraging homebuyers to purchase increasingly larger homes as their economic 
circumstances improved, 26 U.S.C. § 121 (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 1034 (repealed 1997). 
 
42
 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: 
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 88-96 (1993) (reporting on persistent 
racism and its impact on regional housing choices in Detroit); Peter H. Rossi, Urban Revolts 
and the Future of American Cities, in CITIES UNDER SIEGE: AN ANATOMY OF THE GHETTO 
RIOTS, 1964-1968, at 405, 408 (David Boesel & Peter H. Rossi eds., 1971) (discussing white 
dismay at urban race riots in the wake of the civil rights movement). 
 
43
 See TEAFORD, supra note 39, at 134-36.   
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poor schooling,44 lack of green space,45 and overcrowding46 persisted.  Advances in 
personal transportation eliminated the centripetal force holding vertical cities 
together and left these pre-existing centrifugal forces unchecked.  When retreat from 
these negative elements became an option, many vertical-city households decamped 
for more palatable lifestyles in the suburbs.47  As their customers and employees 
opted to move, urban businesses found it convenient, or even essential, to follow.48  
These recent developments are in marked contrast to the urban explosion of the prior 
seventy-five years.49  Rising vacancy in core cities is particularly striking because 
every metropolitan region in America increased its population in the latter half of the 
twentieth century.50 
Because the urban built environment51 developed to support populations much 
larger than present levels, abandoned buildings and vacant lots have become the 
archetypal manifestation of vertical-city decline.52  Today, most vertical cities are 
plagued by tremendous overcapacity in both land area and infrastructure.53  
Significantly, the individualized nature of relocation decisions rendered urban 
population and job losses discontinuous within the geography of the affected cities.54  
The patchwork of vacancies scattered across the municipal fabric make the city’s 
outsized, aging infrastructure increasingly inefficient to operate and creates a 
significant drain on municipal resources.55   
Outmigration of residents and companies also creates a challenging mismatch 
between tax receipts and municipal outlays.  As affluent individuals and profitable 
                                                          
 
44
 See, e.g., JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 
120 (2d ed., Harper Perennial 1992) (1991) (discussing the educational funding disparities 
between cities and their suburbs). 
 
45
 JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 363-64 (1991) (sketching the 
connection between sprawl and the American longing for a connection to nature). 
 
46
 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 268-71 (Modern 
Library 1993) (1961). 
 
47
 TEAFORD, supra note 39, at 98. 
 
48
 Id. at 105-07. 
 
49
 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 4. 
 
50
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 33. 
 
51
 The “built environment” is “[t]hat portion of the physical surroundings created by 
humans as opposed to the natural environment.”  DICTIONARY OF BUILDING PRESERVATION 71 
(Ward Bucher ed. 1996). 
 
52
 Christina Lindsey, Smart Decline, PANORAMA, 2007, at 17, 18. available at 
http://www.design.upenn.edu/new/cplan/panorama2007_files/articles/pdfs/lindsey.pdf; ANN 
O’M. BOWMAN & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, TERRA INCOGNITA: VACANT LAND AND URBAN 
STRATEGIES 1-2, 91-93 (2004). 
 
53
 Popper & Popper, supra note 13, at 21. 
 
54
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 37. 
 
55
 Timothy Moss, “Cold Spots” of Urban Infrastructure: “Shrinking” Processes in 
Eastern Germany and the Modern Infrastructural Ideal, 32.2 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 
436, 436-37 (2008).  
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businesses depart, property values fall, and cities experience revenue losses.56  
Simultaneously, the remaining urban population, being poorer, is in greater need of 
economic assistance.57  This combination of lower municipal revenues and increased 
municipal expenses raises the cost of government per citizen.58  Core cities become 
less competitive than suburbs on tax rates and service quality, which induces further 
departures in a vicious cycle of abandonment and decline.59 
B. Smart Decline Helps Rectify the Fiscal Mismatch Confronting Vacating Cities 
The self-reinforcing momentum of outmigration dooms any hoped-for return to 
the prototypical vertical city of historical memory.60  The bustling American 
metropolises of yesteryear reached their zenith in a postwar economic environment 
where the United States was the only global industrial power that retained its 
manufacturing capacity.61  In hindsight, these cities were themselves temporary 
phenomena destroyed by changed economic circumstances.62  Ignoring this 
macroeconomic reality, municipal officials typically respond to worsening fiscal 
realities by developing aggressive economic-development agendas.  For instance, 
Mayor Eddie A. Perez argued before Congress that “[o]ne of the most important 
responsibilities of any local city government is to provide for economic and cultural 
growth of that community.”63  And proponents of urban eminent domain routinely 
invoke the prospect of municipal growth to legitimize condemnations.64  Mayor Bart 
Peterson went so far as to say that “the availability of eminent domain has probably 
led to more job creation and home ownership opportunities than any other tool that 
there is at the local level.”65   
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For the most part, though, growth-oriented economic-development initiatives 
spend current revenue in an attempt to recreate the population growth that was the 
sine qua non of America’s great historical cities.  Tax abatement, gentrification, 
slum clearance, urban-growth boundaries, urban homesteading, land banks, 
aggressive annexation, and the formation of regional governments have all been 
advocated as ways to subsidize central-city growth.  To preserve urban living as a 
desirable option for the affluent, planners use their eminent-domain authority to 
selectively remove unsightly aspects of the urban experience.  If an opportunity to 
attract a blockbuster commercial or mixed-use real estate development project 
appears, municipal land-use officials often use compulsory purchase to assemble the 
required contiguous acreage. 
C. Eminent Domain and the Case for Shrinking Vacant Cities 
Professors Rybczynski and Linneman break with current planning orthodoxy by 
disparaging the headlong scramble for chimerical additional growth.66  Instead, we 
should recognize that the attractiveness of vertical-city landownership has fallen 
precipitously.67  Once we forsake the unrealistic growth aspirations of conventional 
municipal boosterism, wholesale decommissioning offers several practical benefits 
to struggling central cities.  Shrinking the municipal geography to comport with 
current demand will consolidate the scope of the city’s service obligations.68  The 
resultant reduction in expenses may be the most effective means of correcting urban 
fiscal imbalances and increasing the quality of life for municipal citizens.69   
Ultimately, Rybczynski and Linneman envision deannexation of the affected 
area—and perhaps its eventual sale to a private developer.70  But the wholesale 
decommissioning of an urban neighborhood will require either the revocation of all 
occupancy permits in the affected area or the extinguishment of all private title.  
Revocation of occupancy permits—which can be viewed as a “regulatory 
decommissioning”—has significant strategic disadvantages.  Individual citizens do 
not generally bargain away rights to the government in negotiated exchanges.  
Accordingly, regulatory decommissioning offers far less opportunity for market 
solutions as an alternative to governmental compulsion.  A mere revocation of 
occupancy rights does not provide authority to demolish the vacated structures.  And 
vacant buildings degrade urban communities while municipalities struggle to enforce 
the building code and other laws against absent owners.71  Extinguishment of private 
title is the better course because it enables the demolition of all improvements, 
which, in turn, facilitates governmental supervision of the decommissioned area.  
Finally, a regulatory decommissioning does not block potential compensation claims 
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because affected owners can seek to recover for the effective denial of all 
economically viable use of their property.72   
The tax savings, service improvements, and other benefits of smart decline can 
be threatened by holdout problems as readily as recalcitrant owners can thwart 
conventional development agendas.  If cities wish to reap the full benefit of a 
municipal contraction strategy, compulsory purchase may be unavoidable.  Eminent 
domain allows proactive, geographically targeted acquisitions within a timeframe 
that minimizes municipal holding costs.  While the city must compensate owners in 
the decommissioned area and pay to demolish the affected structures, service 
delivery costs would be much reduced in the absence of occupancy. 
More importantly, the efficiency of municipal service delivery would increase as 
the city removed fatally empty neighborhoods from the service area.73  For instance, 
portions of the municipal water system could be shut down.74  Relocating property 
owners to occupied neighborhoods will allow city departments to be more 
responsive to the same number of constituents without requiring additional 
municipal revenues.75  By accepting the irreversible decline of some neighborhoods, 
municipalities can focus their redevelopment efforts on filling the vacant properties 
in viable neighborhoods, thereby, strengthening those neighborhoods.76  
Furthermore, economic development in the vibrant parts of the city presents greater 
opportunities for public-private partnerships with existing stakeholders.77  It will also 
be easier to attract new private enterprise to these fortified neighborhoods.78 
Admittedly, it is psychologically unsatisfying to dispossess individual property 
owners solely because the government that supports their claim of title is abandoning 
the neighborhood.  These owners kept faith with the city as an engine of civic virtue 
when their neighbors or predecessors-in-interest departed.  It seems cruel to 
dispossess owners who have already suffered the grinding despair that accompanies 
the deterioration of once-vibrant urban neighborhoods when the constituent 
residents, businesses, and civic institutions depart.79  It is also true that some 
businesses and organizations will be unlikely to prosper in a shift to more densely 
occupied neighborhoods.  In relocating to more vibrant neighborhoods, businesses 
may lose a locational monopoly that is critical to their competitive advantage.  And 
churches and other member-based neighborhood organizations may have a difficult 
time maintaining a cohesive membership if that membership disperses to different 
neighborhoods. 
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Nonetheless, there is a significant free-rider problem associated with allowing 
owners to remain in an area where municipal service delivery is drastically 
inefficient.  Other members of the community suffer a reduction in service quality 
and an increase in taxes to subsidize services to geographically isolated owners.80  
Conversely, the benefits of relocation for both the individual and the community 
would be significant.  Individuals relocating to other municipal neighborhoods 
would benefit from the safety, vitality, and amenities of fully occupied 
neighborhoods.81  If the displaced owners chose new sites within the shrunken city 
limits, the municipal efficiencies gained from the contraction would benefit these 
transplants as much as the existing occupants of the viable neighborhoods.   
More research is needed to develop a specific understanding of the financial and 
geographic preconditions that render a municipal-contraction proposal socially 
efficient.  Analyzing the existing cost data to attribute current service and 
infrastructure costs to discrete urban geographies is a critical first step.82  City 
officials will also need to develop reasonably accurate data on vacancy levels within 
those geographies.83  If a neighborhood has both high municipal costs and high 
vacancy, the second level of investigation will involve appraising the fair market 
value of all privately held real estate in the potential decommissioned area.  
 If the neighborhood’s share of municipal costs, capitalized over some 
appropriate period, exceeds the fair market value of the neighborhood’s real estate 
by a large margin, the neighborhood might be a candidate for decommissioning.  The 
final step in the analysis will be to project the level of heightened compensation that 
the municipality might expect to pay to implement its decommissioning strategy.  To 
accurately project these subjective costs, the planning team should determine which 
neighborhood owners have a legitimate claim to heightened compensation, estimate 
the size of the idiosyncratic-value premium for those owners, and determine the 
likelihood that each owner will refuse a negotiated sale.  If the net social benefit 
remains high after deducting these estimated subjective-value costs, the wholesale-
decommissioning strategy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient and should be pursued.84 
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D. Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Legitimacy of Condemnations 
Professors Nicholas Kaldor and J.R. Hicks were both eminent twentieth-century 
economists.  In 1939, each scholar separately published an article in The Economic 
Journal addressing one of the foremost debates in contemporary economics.85  Both 
Kaldor and Hicks were responding to a problem explored by Professor Lionel 
Robbins in an earlier Economic Journal article.86   
Professor Robbins was troubled by the assumption inherent in utilitarian 
economics that every human being has an equal capacity for economic satisfaction.87  
Economists studying the social utility of economic arrangements—most notably 
Professor A.C. Pigou in his landmark book on utilitarian economics, The Economics 
of Welfare88—assumed that all human beings possessed the same ability to 
appreciate the satisfaction of their individual tastes.89  Those individual tastes might 
differ, but each person’s potential for happiness was the same.90  Professor Robbins’ 
trouble was that this assumption—which Professor Pigou deemed essential to the 
utilitarian economists’ normative assessment of competing economic policies91—
“rested upon ethical principle rather than upon scientific demonstration.”92  For 
Professor Robbins, acknowledging the value-laden nature of the equal-capacity-for-
satisfaction assumption meant “that economics as a science could say nothing by 
way of prescription. . . .  It was not possible to say that economic science showed 
that free trade was justifiable, that inequality should be mitigated, that the income tax 
should be graduated, and so forth.”93  In an era marked by an abiding enthusiasm for 
scientific advancement, Professor Robbins and other economists preferred normative 
claims that carried the imprimatur of scientific validity.94   
Initially crestfallen, Professor Robbins realized upon reflection that he had 
merely rendered explicit a normative assumption that undergirded the economic-
policy arguments he was making.95  He conceded that human beings are—strictly 
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speaking—unequal in both endowments and desires.96  He also felt, however, that, 
“in most cases, political calculations which do not treat them as if they were equal 
are morally revolting.”97  By treating this normative assumption—and the 
assumption of equal capacity for satisfaction that flows from it—as an article of faith 
that motivated his scientific inquiries, Professor Robbins salvaged all he thought he 
could of the scientific in his approach.  If others disagreed with his normative 
premise, he would have to meet them with the tools of normative inquiry, not with 
the scientific method.98  Accordingly, Professor Robbins responded to Professor 
Pigou by propounding “the necessity for independent and systematic study of the 
ends which prescriptions based on economics might serve,” for which he was 
roundly—and, he hoped to show, undeservedly—condemned.99  Professor Robbins 
summed up his 1938 Economic Journal rebuttal essay by saying, “I think that the 
assumption of equality comes from outside, and that its justification is more ethical 
than scientific.”100  He ended by saying that “the real difference of opinion is not 
between those who dispute concerning the exact area to be designated by the 
adjective scientific, but between those who hold that human beings should be treated 
as if they were equal and those who hold that they should not.”101 
Professor Kaldor’s piece appeared the following September.  Even as he agreed 
with Professor Robbins that the claim of equal capacity for satisfaction was non-
scientific, Professor Kaldor questioned an assumption shared by both Professor 
Robbins and his critics.  Before Professor Kaldor’s article, economists on both sides 
of the social-utility debate agreed “that the scientific justification of [social-utility] 
comparisons determines whether ‘economics as a science can say anything by way 
of prescription.”102  Professor Kaldor argued, instead, that it was possible to show—
even absent proof that all citizens possess equal capacity for satisfaction—that 
certain economic policies should be pursued and others discontinued.103  For 
example, policies that increase physical production moot the issue of equal capacity 
for satisfaction because such policies create new wealth to compensate persons 
negatively affected by the policy change.104  As Professor Kaldor put it, the 
economist does not need to show that “nobody in the community is going to suffer.  
In order to establish his case, it is quite sufficient for him to show that even if all 
those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, the rest of the 
community will still be better off than before.”105  Professor Kaldor specifically 
sought to redeem the prescriptive capacity of economists, despite uncertainty about 
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human beings’ relative capacity for happiness.  The genius of his solution is that it 
applies to many economic-policy issues, including the legitimacy of governmental 
condemnation of private property. 
Professor Hicks published a slightly longer piece in the very next issue of The 
Economic Journal.106 Following critiques of Professor Pigou’s book, Professor 
Hicks’ article incorporated Professor Kaldor’s elegant resolution of Professor 
Robbins’ specific problem into a broader rehabilitation of the social-utility tradition.  
Professor Hicks sought to rescue the social-utility tradition from the marginalized 
status to which Professor Robbins reluctantly condemned it—that of a mere 
“interesting ethical postulate.”107   
Social-utility theorists, as Professor Hicks understood them, are concerned with 
the relative economic efficiency of various economic systems in maximizing the 
quantity of satisfaction available to individuals and to society as a whole.108  But it is 
precisely in making such evaluations that the assumption of an equal capacity for 
satisfaction injects the subjective values of the investigator into the analysis.109  For 
Professor Hicks, Professor Kaldor’s great achievement was in demonstrating that the 
question of individuals’ relative capacity for satisfaction is actually irrelevant to 
many evaluations of the relative efficiency of economic systems.110  The critical 
insight is that, regarding individuals, satisfaction is not always a zero-sum game.111  
Certainly there are situations where an increase in one individual’s satisfaction will 
cause a simultaneous decrease in satisfaction for someone else.  But in other 
instances, an individual’s satisfaction can increase without a negative impact on 
anyone else.112   
Professor Hicks extended Professor Kaldor’s observation to define the set of 
“optimum” economic systems, each characterized by the absence of no-cost 
opportunities to improve any individual’s satisfaction.113  There is a multiplicity of 
such systems—each manifesting a different distribution of the total available 
wealth.114  But each optimum system shares the essential characteristic that “every 
individual is as well off as he can be made, subject to the condition that no 
reorganisation [sic] permitted shall make any individual worse off.”115  In a 
suboptimal system, by contrast, “[s]ome at least of the individuals in the system can 
have their wants satisfied better, without anyone having to make a sacrifice in order 
to achieve that end.”116 
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Professor Hicks noted that in pre-existing economies, “no simple economic 
reform can be a permitted reorganisation [sic] in [the economic] sense, because it 
always inflicts a loss of some sort upon some people.”117  To resolve this difficulty, 
Professor Hicks—and Professor Kaldor before him118—postulated a hypothetical 
comprehensive just-compensation regime, saying that “we can always suppose that 
special measures are taken through the public revenue to compensate those people 
who are damaged.”119  In words that provide the essential germ of the test that the 
American judiciary should adopt in the eminent-domain context, Professor Hicks 
summed up by saying, “A ‘permitted reorganisation’ [sic] [in economic terms] must 
thus be taken from now on to mean a reorganisation [sic] which will allow of 
compensation being paid, and which will yet show a net advantage.  The position is 
not optimum so long as such reorganisation [sic] is possible.”120  To adopt this 
economic test, judges evaluating the legitimacy of a contested condemnation would 
do well to require a showing that the taking will provide a quantifiable net public 
benefit, even after the owner is justly compensated.  Because of the consequences for 
the private individual and the potential for abuse, courts should require the 
condemning authority to prove this point by clear and convincing evidence. 
III. PUBLIC-PURPOSE TAKINGS AND THE LEGALITY OF SHRINKING CITIES 
Public-purpose takings are challenged on four key grounds: purported violations 
of the positive law of the United States, purported violations of universal natural 
law, non-conformity with the American tradition, and incompatibility with sound 
public policy.  Of these objections, the first three are erroneous.121  The policy-based 
critiques have the greatest merit, but they can be addressed by just-compensation 
reform and a requirement that government prove the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of the 
condemnation by clear and convincing evidence.122   
A. Public-Purpose Takings Are Consistent with American Positive Law 
Eminent-domain opponents argue that public-purpose takings violate the plain 
meaning of the U.S. Constitution and the legitimate Supreme Court precedents.  
Both arguments disregard the complex interplay between American law and the 
economic health of the nation. 
1. Plain Meaning and Property Rights 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution addresses 
the federal power to take private property through eminent domain: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”123  The phrase 
“public use” is not defined in the Constitution, and its ambiguity is the source of the 
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eminent-domain controversy.  Some opponents of public-purpose takings argue that 
the Constitution’s requirement of public use bars all government takings that are 
justified solely in terms of economic benefit.124  These critics often insist that the 
public-use requirement restricts takings to situations involving direct use of the land 
by a government entity following the expropriation.125  They quote Justice Samuel 
Chase’s memorable chestnut from Calder v. Bull126—that “a law that takes property 
from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a 
Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have 
done it”127—as support for a strict reading of the public-use requirement.128  What is 
rarely noted, however, is that Justice Chase’s epigram is dictum in an estate 
dispute.129  He made the remark to illustrate a general point about due process of law, 
not to precisely delineate the limits of the government’s power of eminent domain.130   
Senator John Cornyn has stated that “the protection of homes, small businesses 
and other private property rights against government seizure and other unreasonable 
government interference is a fundamental principle and core commitment of our 
Nation’s Founders.”131  But economic growth was the vital concern of the Framers, 
not the affirmation of fixed property rights in any absolute sense.  The Framers 
wanted a federal government with sufficient power to overrule the growth-retarding 
practices of particular colonial and state governments.  At the same time, they sought 
to prevent the national government from enacting economically repressive measures 
of its own.132  After independence, barriers to economic prosperity developed under 
the ineffectual Articles of Confederation, such as debilitating interstate tariffs and 
the inability to satisfy national debts.  Often, these barriers resulted from state 
political elites exploiting the weakness of the Articles of Confederation for local 
advantage; a sort of state-level rent-seeking that is loosely analogous to the behavior 
of unreasonable holdout owners in the urban land-assembly context.  The desire to 
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remedy the economic defects of the Articles of Confederation was a major impetus 
for the federal Constitution.133 
A narrow reading of the public-use requirement denies the legislature the power 
to subordinate private property rights to collective economic needs.134  But 
governmental mediation of individual and communal interests has shaped the 
American economy from its very beginnings.  For example, the Commerce Clause 
gives Congress overarching authority to regulate interstate commerce for the benefit 
of the national economy, even if its enactments are adverse to particular citizen 
interests.135  The Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to modify individual 
property interests in other instances as well, most notably in bankruptcy.136 
Expounding on the scope of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden,137 Chief 
Justice John Marshall, a noted Federalist during and after the ratification period, 
used judicial review to prevent individual rights from imposing an undue burden on 
community interests.  In Gibbons, the plaintiff sought enforcement of a Hudson 
River ferry-service monopoly granted by the state of New York against a rival 
operator based in New Jersey.138  The case is most frequently cited for the 
proposition that Congress has plenary power to regulate interstate commerce.  But 
Chief Justice Marshall also stated that the community’s interest in a flourishing 
commercial life was of sufficient importance to justify depriving the monopoly 
holder of his legislatively granted right.139  Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the 
Federalist commitment to governmental involvement in communal economic 
advancement, stating: 
Over whatever other interests of the country this government may diffuse 
its benefits, and its blessings, it will always be true, as matter of historical 
fact, that it had its immediate origin in the necessities of commerce; and, 
for its immediate object, the relief of those necessities . . . by establishing 
a uniform and steady system. 140 
Opponents of public-purpose takings mistakenly characterize Justice Chase’s 
Due Process argument as an interpretation of the Takings Clause.  They also ignore 
the central importance of economic rationality to the national project conceived by 
the Federalists during the Revolution and successfully implemented with the 
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ratification of the federal Constitution.  Accordingly, the argument that public-
purpose takings offend the plain meaning of the U.S. Constitution is mistaken. 
2. Public-Purpose Takings and Supreme Court Precedent 
Eminent-domain opponents also argue that public-purpose takings are contrary to 
Supreme Court precedent.  But these precedent-based objections misplace the origin 
of the public-purpose-takings doctrine.  For instance, Dana Berliner—a lawyer for 
the Institute for Justice, the pre-eminent property-rights advocacy group—
erroneously told the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that “[t]he expansion of the 
public use doctrine began with the urban renewal movement of the 1950s.”141  
Contrary to Ms. Berliner’s assertion, the Supreme Court conflated public use and 
public purpose as early as 1896.142   
The distinction between public use and mere public benefit restrained the 
governmental exercise of eminent domain for roughly a century.  Starting in the late 
1800s, the growing infrastructure needs of economically important, wholly private 
industries—such as mining and agriculture—prompted a nascent public-purpose 
interpretation of the public-use requirement.  The earliest public-purpose cases 
approved condemnations to facilitate the expansion of infrastructure for activities 
that judges considered beneficial to the broader community.  These cases explicitly 
viewed the takings issue through the lens of economic growth.143  As a 
jurisprudential matter, it is a small step from these economic-growth takings to the 
economic-redevelopment takings condoned after 1954.144 
a. The Supreme Court and the Promotion of Economic Growth 
Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley145 opened a new era in Takings Clause 
jurisprudence, asserting that the Fifth Amendment’s public-use requirement is met if 
the resulting change in land use produces a significant social benefit.  In Bradley, a 
California landowner—Ms. Bradley—refused to pay an assessment levied by the 
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local irrigation district and the district foreclosed on her property.146  In the resulting 
U.S. Supreme Court case, Ms. Bradley argued that “the use for which the water is to 
be procured is not in any sense a public one, . . . and the interest of the public is 
nothing more than that indirect and collateral benefit that it derives from every 
improvement of a useful character that is made in the State.”147  Thus, the meaning 
of the phrase “public use” in the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause determined the 
proper judicial resolution of Ms. Bradley’s federal constitutional claim. 
i. The Court’s Incorporation Blunder 
In 1896, the Fifth Amendment did not protect Ms. Bradley against a state 
eminent domain action because the Court had not yet incorporated the Takings 
Clause against the States.148  Before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,149 
the federal constitutional limitations on eminent domain, like all of the Bill of 
Rights’ protections for individuals, did not apply to state- and local-government 
actions.150  In fact, the Supreme Court did not extend the Takings Clause to cover 
state expropriations until 1897.151   
The establishment of irrigation as a public use in California by state constitution, 
state statute, and state judicial decision could have made Bradley a very simple case.  
In addition to these favorable elements, the California Supreme Court had already 
approved the use of eminent domain in the irrigation context.152  On a strict reading, 
the California statute would have satisfied the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  In Davidson v. New Orleans,153 the Court noted: 
If private property be taken for public uses without just compensation, it 
must be remembered that, when the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was 
adopted, the provision on that subject, in immediate juxtaposition in the 
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[F]ifth [A]mendment with the one we are construing [i.e., the Fourteenth 
Amendment], was left out, and this [due process language] was taken.154 
Thus, Davidson explicitly bars the application of the federal Takings Clause to 
state condemnation actions because the Fourteenth Amendment paraphrases the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, but omits the latter’s Takings-Clause language.  
And Justice Rufus W. Peckham, writing for the Bradley majority, cited Davidson 
multiple times in Bradley.155 
The Davidson Court did admit that some state condemnations might be so 
egregious as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, echoing 
Justice Chase’s language describing the federal Due Process standard almost eighty 
years earlier: 
It seems to us that a statute which declares in terms, and without more, 
that the full and exclusive title of a described piece of land, which is now 
in A., shall be and is hereby vested in B., would, if effectual, deprive A. 
of his property without due process of law, within the meaning of the 
constitutional provision.156 
The Court seems to contemplate—just as Justice Chase likely did in Calder—a 
private law enacted by the legislative body to transfer title in land without any 
assertion of broader social benefit.  Even the most ardent eminent-domain 
proponents would condemn this sort of blatant legislative chicanery.   
In any event, the centrality of the textual comparison between the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Davidson holding suggests that—at least as of 
1877—the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause did not extend the Takings 
Clause to the states.  In fact, the Court did not explicitly incorporate the Takings 
Clause against the states until Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. 
Chicago in 1897.157   
It is perhaps overly technical to insist that Bradley’s extension of the Takings 
Clause to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
lacks sound doctrinal basis because Bradley preceded Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
Railroad Co. by one year.  Nonetheless, property-rights advocates might justifiably 
attack Bradley’s disregard of precedent and reliance on the as-yet-unarticulated 
incorporation of the Takings Clause.  Justice Peckham ascended to the Supreme 
Court on January 6, 1896,158 only months before the Bradley opinion’s release on 
November 16.159  Thus, critics might minimize the Bradley holding as sloppy 
jurisprudence by a novice Associate Justice.  To the extent that property-rights 
advocates are motivated by a libertarian worldview, however, they should refrain 
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from a general disparagement of Justice Peckham’s jurisprudence.  Nine years after 
Bradley, he wrote the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York,160 the keystone of 
the libertarian substantive-due-process doctrine. 
ii. Judicial Equation of Public Purpose and Public Use 
The Supreme Court had no occasion to directly interpret the public-use 
requirement until 1875.161  Condemnations by the federal government in the early 
nineteenth century rarely caused controversy.  During this period, federal authorities 
primarily used eminent domain to acquire property for direct government use.162  
The constitutionality of these takings was beyond reproach, and there was 
correspondingly little reason for litigation regarding the issue to reach the Supreme 
Court.163  States were far more active users of eminent domain at this time, but they 
were not bound by the Takings Clause until 1897.164  Consequently, it was not until 
Kohl v. United States165 that the Court asserted that only direct government use 
justified a taking.  There, the Court stated that “[t]he proper view of the right of 
eminent domain seems to be, that it is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take 
private property for its own public uses, and not for those of another.  Beyond that, 
there exists no necessity; which alone is the foundation of the right.”166 
In 1885, the Court indirectly reaffirmed this doctrinal boundary in Cole v. La 
Grange.167  Parsing a Takings Clause analogue in the Missouri State Constitution,168 
Justice Horace Gray stated that the clause “clearly presupposes that private property 
cannot be taken for private use.  Otherwise, as it makes no provision for 
compensation except when the use is public, it would permit private property to be 
taken or appropriated for private use without any compensation whatever.”169 
In Bradley, the Court abruptly changed course.  Justice Peckham asserted that 
direct government use of an improvement, such as the irrigation system at issue, is 
not a necessary condition for a finding of public use.170  This statement directly 
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contradicts the standard of direct governmental use enunciated in Kohl and Cole, yet 
Justice Peckham provided no analysis to justify his rejection of the precedent.171  The 
California State Constitution explicitly defined the “sale, rental or distribution” of 
water “to be a public use,” and the California Supreme Court had already declared 
the irrigation statute compatible with the state constitution.172  Thus, denied any other 
constitutional claim, Ms. Bradley asserted that the California statute violated federal 
Due Process: 
It is claimed, . . . that the citizen is deprived of his property without due 
process of law, if it be taken by or under state authority for any other than 
a public use, either under the guise of taxation or by the assumption of the 
right of eminent domain. In that way the question whether private 
property has been taken for any other than a public use becomes material 
in this court, even where the taking is under the authority of the State 
instead of the Federal government.173 
Having laid out Ms. Bradley’s claim and established the Court’s jurisdiction, 
Justice Peckham then asked, “Is this assessment, for the non-payment of which the 
land of the plaintiff was to be sold, levied for a public purpose?”174  It is the first of 
several instances in which he interchangeably used “public purpose,” “public use,” 
and “public interest.”175   
The Bradley majority framed the case as a conflict between overall economic 
growth and individual property rights.176  Justice Peckham worked hard to convey 
the importance of the economic opportunity at hand: 
While the consideration that the work of irrigation must be abandoned if 
the use of the water may not be held to be or constitute a public use is not 
to be regarded as conclusive in favor of such use, yet that fact is in this 
case a most important consideration.  Millions of acres of land otherwise 
cultivable must be left in their present arid and worthless condition, and 
an effectual obstacle will therefore remain in the way of the advance of a 
large portion of the State in material wealth and prosperity. To irrigate 
and thus to bring into possible cultivation these large masses of otherwise 
worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of public 
interest, not confined to the landowners, or even to any one section of the 
State. 177 
The Court concluded that all California landowners should pay to create an 
irrigation system to serve particular private parties.  It reasoned that forgoing the 
economic activity that the irrigation would generate was unthinkable and held that 
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“we have no doubt that the irrigation of really arid lands is a public purpose, and the 
water thus used is put to a public use.”178  Despite the fact that the local irrigation 
district served other private individuals at a cost to Ms. Bradley, the U.S. Supreme 
Court found that the taking was justified because the resulting agricultural-
productivity gains fostered economic activity and augmented the food supply. 179 
In subsequent eminent-domain decisions, the Court subordinated individual 
ownership rights by applying Bradley’s public-purpose rationale in diverse factual 
circumstances to satisfy the exigencies of a growing economy.180  For instance, in the 
twenty years following Bradley, public-purpose doctrine greatly expanded the power 
of eminent domain for irrigation purposes.181  In 1896, the Court broke with 
precedent and compelled Ms. Bradley to help finance construction of a 
comprehensive system of irrigation on the property of others.182  Nine years later, the 
Court employed the same rationale to force an owner to permit alteration of an 
existing irrigation ditch on his property to benefit unrelated parties.183  After two 
decades, the Court had sufficiently expanded the doctrine to require an owner to 
accept construction of a drainage ditch across his own previously undisturbed land 
for the economic benefit of others.184   
b. A New Role for the Court—Economic Regulation 
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence in support of socially beneficial 
private infrastructure presaged the expansion of the public-purpose rationale to serve 
the emerging discipline of urban planning.  That discipline arose in response to the 
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runaway growth of American cities in the late nineteenth century.185  One of the most 
daunting political tasks of the urban heyday was the creation of a new legal order to 
mitigate the harmful excesses of this demographic and economic growth. 186  
Justified as a means to regulate—rather than to solely promote—economic growth, 
the new rules significantly impacted American property rights.187 
The most significant municipal effort to regulate the physical growth of cities in 
this period was the enactment of municipal zoning laws.  Before zoning ordinances, 
the common law of nuisance constrained a property owner in a less absolute manner 
by preventing owners from using their property in ways that interfered with the quiet 
enjoyment of their neighbors.188  Nuisance cases are decided after a case specific 
facts-and-circumstances inquiry.  Ordinances codifying the categorical 
pronouncements of a professional class of land-use planners gave municipal officials 
a powerful new tool to comprehensively direct the physical development of their 
cities.  Governments justified compulsory zoning laws and the discretionary power 
of unelected planners by saying that scientific application of universal planning 
principles could prevent “undesirable” land-use patterns.  Modern-day eminent-
domain critics frequently question whether public officials actually know better than 
private users when it comes to land-use planning.189 
Private-autonomy concerns notwithstanding, the Supreme Court supported the 
extension of planning authority over private owners in Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty.190  In Ambler, the property owner alleged significant real-estate depreciation 
after the city enacted zoning legislation that barred a more lucrative industrial use on 
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the land in favor of less profitable residential uses.191  The Court upheld the zoning 
regulation because it was substantially related to the public’s general welfare.192   
Despite this victory for growth regulation, zoning laws failed to prevent the fiscal 
mismatch now gripping many vertical cities.193  Zoning laws are a passive control on 
property, inoperative until private actors seek to alter existing land uses.  Thus, 
zoning as a land-use control depends upon growth and investment.  The passivity of 
zoning controls explains why they are unable to address the disinvestment that 
characterizes urban decline.   
To address urban disinvestment, planners developed a slum-clearance model that 
involved the condemnation and demolition of unmaintained buildings.194  In Berman 
v. Parker,195 the Supreme Court considered the sufficiency of a comprehensive 
blight-removal plan as a public-purpose rationale for the taking of private property.  
A group of private owners objected to the condemnation of their department store, 
which was well-maintained despite being located within the blighted area.196   
For the Supreme Court, the legislature’s assertion that reversing neighborhood 
decline required comprehensive slum clearance provided a valid public purpose that 
trumped the interests of the individual owners.197  Justice William O. Douglas, 
substituting the phrase “public welfare” for Justice Peckham’s “public interest” and 
“public purpose,” eloquently captured the expansiveness of the public-purpose 
requirement: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.  The values it 
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary.  
It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community 
should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-
balanced as well as carefully patrolled.  In the present case, the Congress 
and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into 
account a wide variety of values.  It is not for us to reappraise them.  If 
those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation’s 
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth 
Amendment that stands in the way.198 
This highly permissive approach to governmental takings is a long way from the 
Kohl Court’s early holding that eminent domain was legitimate only if the 
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government employed the citizen’s property for its direct use.199  But Justice 
Douglas’ analysis is only a short distance from the Bradley Court’s equation of 
public benefit and public use.200 
In Kelo, the Supreme Court reiterated that the ostensible public purposes 
advanced by the legislature to support an eminent domain action are not susceptible 
to substantive judicial review.201  The case involved the taking of non-blighted 
residences in an economically depressed, but unblighted, neighborhood in 
conjunction with a comprehensive economic-redevelopment plan for the area.202  
The majority of the contested properties were in the right-of-way of planned new 
roadways and, therefore, might have been justifiably condemned under the direct-
government-use test first enunciated in Kohl.203  The City of New London’s 
attorneys downplayed this argument to provide the Court with an opportunity to rule 
on whether economic-development plans permit the taking of property from one 
private party for transfer to another.204  The Court obliged, holding such takings 
constitutional provided that the redevelopment plan emerges from an inclusive 
planning process,205 bears no indication of an illegitimate attempt to benefit specific 
private parties,206 and state law does not restrict public-purpose takings.207 
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens made what prospectively 
appeared to be a commonplace observation about condemnations for economic-
development purposes: “[N]either precedent nor logic supports [the contention that 
economic development is not a public use].  Promoting economic development is a 
traditional and long-accepted function of government.”208  Justice Stevens explicitly 
cited Bradley and several of its progeny in support of these assertions.209 
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Although Kelo broke little new doctrinal ground,210 the decision generated an 
unexpected firestorm of controversy.211  Responding to the outcry, virtually every 
state considered whether to restrict public-purpose takings.212  Some states rejected 
the deferential Kelo approach.213  There are several possible explanations for the 
divergence of state and federal law.  State actors may have proven more sympathetic 
to incorrect formulations of the philosophy of property rights advanced by eminent-
domain opponents.214  The expansionist mythology of the American frontier may be 
more sacrosanct in the eyes of states, the majority of which owe their existence to 
national expansion.215  Finally, the pragmatic concerns attendant upon every exercise 
of eminent domain may loom larger in the minds of state officials.216  Lawmakers 
seeking to curb eminent-domain abuse often focused on compensation reform.217  
States that instead fixated on a category-based approach to public use merely revived 
the theoretical difficulties that accompany any effort to narrowly define “public use” 
in a post-Bradley world.218   
c. Promoting Economic Growth and the Resulting Judicial Conundrum 
As discussed above, Justice Peckham’s Bradley opinion elides the distinction 
between “public use,” public benefit,” and “public purpose.”  We have also seen that 
the Bradley Court cites the practical needs of a growing economy, rather than 
precedent or legal reasoning, as justification for the expropriation of private 
property.  Despite the weaknesses of the Bradley opinion that created the public-
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purpose justification, its longevity offers the best available explanation for the Kelo 
majority’s portrayal of the precedent as incontrovertible.  One of the curiosities of 
the Kelo opinion is that the Court’s more-liberal members took an 
uncharacteristically rigid approach to the relevant precedent, while its more-
conservative members downplayed the importance of that prior case law in their 
dissents.  Some time after the decision, in a highly unusual public comment, Justice 
Stevens stated that he disfavored the practical consequences of his own judicial 
opinion.219  For Stevens, Bradley’s persistence dictated an inescapable result despite 
his personal misgivings.   
The attractiveness of the economic-growth idiom explains Bradley’s endurance 
as legal precedent.  Appeals to social utility hold powerful rhetorical force, 
especially when an economic-growth opportunity is involved.  Consider Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s disposition of an eminent-domain case benefiting a 
private utility company: 
In the organic relations of modern society it may sometimes be hard to 
draw the line that is supposed to limit the authority of the legislature to 
exercise or delegate the power of eminent domain.  But to [generate 
electricity] is to supply what, next to intellect, is the very foundation of all 
our achievements and all our welfare.  If that purpose is not public, we 
should be at a loss to say what is.220   
To further buttress his legal conclusion, Justice Holmes cited a string of cases 
that themselves rely upon Bradley as precedent.221 
It is tempting to reject Bradley and its progeny because of this policy-based 
jurisprudence.  In pursuit of the commendable goal of ending eminent domain abuse, 
such a rejection of judicial precedent would upend previously settled questions about 
the legitimacy of condemnations to support power generation, railroad 
transportation, and other key segments of the American economy.222  Uprooting so 
much precedent is a daunting prospect for judges, not to be undertaken lightly.  In 
the 1980s, Professor Bernard H. Siegan—one of the progenitors of the property-
rights movement—lost a federal appellate judgeship largely because he advocated a 
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judicial rejection of decades of precedent to resurrect the Lochner era’s substantive-
due-process doctrine.223 
Excising the pre-Berman cases from the public-purpose debate conveniently 
avoids the confrontation between the growth facilitation so central to American 
expectations of government and the equally important emphasis in American thought 
on individual autonomy.  In her testimony before the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, Ms. Berliner illustrated the conflict between defining public use in 
absolute terms and preserving the power of eminent domain where its use is vital to 
economic growth.224  She initially contended that “public use” means public 
ownership, saying, “Public use is—most people find it to be fairly clear, and to mean 
use and ownership by the public as opposed to some sort of possible public 
benefit.”225  When pressed, however, she offered a more expansive view of the 
requirement, saying, “I think that the kinds of things that eminent domain could be 
used for would be actual public ownership, public utilities, common carriers and to 
deal with things like abandoned property or public nuisances, but not for private 
commercial development beyond that.”226 
But thorough analysis of precedent prevents selective reading of the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncements on the public-purpose takings question.  Reconsidering the 
critique of Berman-style economic-redevelopment takings, the true objection is to 
the government’s assertion of net social gain rather than a claim that eminent-
domain disputes should not be subjected to this sort of economic calculus.  
Economic redevelopment lacks the unalloyed excitement that accompanies 
economic-growth proposals in previously undeveloped areas.  Many times, a 
proposed land-use plan shuffles around a few streets and consolidates some 
parcels—all to facilitate the replacement of the existing structures with some higher-
value use.  It is easier to regard power generation, irrigation, and the like as socially 
beneficial, perhaps because Americans view a redevelopment proposal as an 
admission that the first attempt to order the social consumption of land was a failure.  
Irrigation plans and redevelopment plans are both grounded in economic-efficiency 
concerns, but only the redevelopment plan carries with it this taint of defeat.  The 
claim that the Supreme Court misread the relevant case law is untenable to anyone 
unwilling to reject our modern economy.  Rather, the argument should be that the 
Court improperly calculated condemnation’s social benefits in certain eminent-
domain cases.  Compensation that properly values the loss to displaced owners and a 
Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency analysis of those purported social benefits preserves needed 
flexibility for condemning authorities while preventing injustice to individual 
landholders. 
B. Natural Law Permits Public-Purpose Takings 
The most philosophically profound argument against public-purpose takings is 
that they violate the natural law of property.  This argument appears in three 
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variations, each fatally flawed.  First, the argument that property rights are essential 
to democracy contradicts the modern understanding of political participation, an 
understanding that John Locke’s writings on consent fostered in pre-Revolutionary 
American thought.  Second, the assertion that property rights are inviolable natural 
rights blurs the distinction between English “ancient rights” and universal rights 
grounded in natural law.  Moreover, it proves too much, for if private property rights 
were inviolable, no exercise of eminent domain would be justifiable.  Third, the 
claim that property rights are inherent in the rule of law proves too little because a 
legal regime can support private property rights in every way necessary for 
maximum social utility without rendering them absolute.  Accordingly, the natural-
law objections to public-purpose takings are founded in error. 
1. Property Rights and Democratic Citizenship 
Proponents and opponents of public-purpose takings agree that people have 
“important autonomy interests” in their property.227  Opponents go farther, however, 
and suggest that property ownership is essential to independent democratic 
citizenship.  Professor Steven J. Eagle, for instance, states that “[o]wnership of one’s 
home, and also ownership of one’s business, gives a sense of independence that 
permits and encourages participation in civic and political life as a full member of 
the community, and not as a supplicant dependent upon government largess.”228 
a. Property and Civic Identity 
In the English common-law tradition, property was the source of autonomous 
civic identity.  Common law theorists thought independent property rights 
safeguarded the capacity for resistance to autocratic royal power and created 
individual agency in more mundane political activities.  As Professor Hendrik 
Hartog noted: 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries property was defined not 
simply as material possessions but as all the attributes of personality that 
created individuality. . . . It was the quality, the permanence, and the 
security of an individual’s property rights that gave him political 
significance. 
Property, then, was a guarantee of independence.  Without it there was no 
protection from “the political dependence upon others which constitutes corruption.”  
The autonomy that property made possible was not simply a form of resistance to 
interference or intervention.  It was closely tied to the very possibility of an 
individualized personality, to a classical notion of citizenship.229   
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These pre-Revolutionary notions of property differ greatly from the modern 
understanding.  During that time, one’s inherited social standing was a part of one’s 
property.  Contemporary theorists saw an individual’s property and his civic 
personality, in the sense of his capacity for individual political action, as 
conterminous.230 
Some participants in early debates over American suffrage used the physical 
dependency inherent in propertylessness to justify restricting the franchise.  Political 
theorists thought that individuals without property were vulnerable to pressure from 
their providers.231  More fundamentally, thinkers such as John Adams saw these 
individuals as “incapable of making independent, rational decisions.”232  Locke 
subverted this paradigm by suggesting that individual agency depends upon rational 
understanding, not property ownership.  Professor Holly Brewer traces the 
radicalism of Locke in this regard, noting, for instance, that Locke “gave examples 
of women who, based on their experience, used their reason well. . . .  In short, his 
argument was that a ‘country gentle-woman’ has greater understanding than a 
learned clergyman versed in syllogisms.”233  Experience, not property, is the source 
of reason in the Lockean formulation.234  As Professor Brewer says, “Locke clearly 
accentuated reason, or mental independence, as critical to freedom, but he correlated 
this mental independence only weakly with physical independence, or property 
ownership.”235 
Furthermore, property ownership might create political sycophancy rather than a 
salutary independence from government.  Tracing the connection between ownership 
and submission to authority, Locke wrote that “every man, that hath any Possession, 
or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any Government, doth thereby give 
his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience to the Laws of that 
Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it.”236  Property ownership 
might also press owners toward corrupted servility to despotic power.237  For 
instance, the country gentry that opposed royal power in eighteenth-century England 
was dependent upon Royal and Parliamentary power to enforce its prerogatives 
against the lower classes.238  This dependence restrained the radicalism of English 
dissident elites.239  In America, by contrast, local elites maintained their privileges 
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within colonial society with less assistance from the distant power of the Crown.240  
It is no coincidence that American elites were correspondingly more prone than their 
English peers to a radicalization of political views.241 
b. Locke, Political Legitimacy, and Property 
Some modern defenders of private property claim that the Lockean social 
contract gives rise to an absolute right to private property.242  Numerous 
commentators favorably quote Locke’s statement, “Lives, Liberties, and Estates, 
which I call by the general Name, Property” as evidence that the philosopher’s 
compact theory of government represents an eighteenth-century wellspring of 
property rights.243  Roger Pilon—a Cato Institute scholar—uses Locke’s formulation 
of the social contract to argue that the power of eminent domain has no valid source 
in a contract theory of government.244  One modern day eminent-domain opponent 
quoted Samuel Adams, who justified colonial resistance to the Crown in seemingly 
Lockean terms when he said, “Among the natural rights of the colonists are these: 
first, a right to life; secondly, to liberty; thirdly to property; together with the right to 
support and defend them in the best manner they can.”245   
Locke was unquestionably a part of the intellectual milieu of the Revolutionary 
generation.246  But his primary contribution to Revolutionary political theory was to 
provide justifications for the rejection of the British monarchy and a philosophical 
source for the new states’ sovereignty.247  Locke secularized the doctrine of consent, 
a means of legitimating political authority that John Milton and others derived from 
Protestant theology.248  These thinkers developed the doctrine from the principle that 
all people were born equal and, therefore, were free to choose obedience to a just 
ruler and—more pertinently for contemporary Anglo-American dissidents—
resistance to an unjust one.249  Consent theory deemphasized the connection between 
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property ownership and political participation, significantly reducing the role of 
property in the maintenance of individual freedom.250  The conclusion that even the 
propertyless were capable of both agency and resistance exploded “the fragile 
connection between property, independence, and reason.”251  By doing so, consent 
theory discredited classical thinkers’ attempts to justify hierarchical political 
relationships on the basis of property ownership.  Thus, contrary to the assertions of 
property-rights advocates, Locke’s work—particularly his writings on the role of 
consent in legitimating the sovereignty of government—reduced the importance of 
property ownership for democratic citizenship. 
c. American Republicanism in the Absence of a Landed Gentry 
Revolutionary leaders valued Locke’s contribution to consent theory, but 
Montesquieu was more influential than Locke in the development of American 
constitutional thought.252  As Professor Brewer noted, “In eighteenth-century North 
America, students were more likely to be familiar with [Locke’s] Essay concerning 
Human Understanding and Some Thoughts concerning Education than with his 
treatises on government.”253  After using Locke to establish political legitimacy, state 
leaders structured their new governments in classical republican—not Lockean—
terms.254  Largely through the writings of Montesquieu, Machiavellian ideas about 
the tension between virtue and corruption became fundamental tenets of American 
Revolutionary politics.255  Machiavelli explained the failure of the Roman Republic 
as the triumph of political corruption—itself caused by imperial expansion—over the 
public virtue that was necessary for republicanism to persist.256   
The self-restraint that constitutes public virtue in the classical republican theory 
of government requires each citizen to acknowledge his membership in the class of 
either the One, the Few, or the Many.257  The republican citizen is expected to temper 
his individual self-interest to actualize his class-determined role in civil society, 
while leaving to the other classes those activities and expressions inherent in their 
role within the polity.258  Corruption begins when members of any class place self-
interest over the fulfillment of their appointed roles.  And classical theory held that 
corruption, if left unchecked, would lead to the downfall of the republic. 
Colonial Americans were predisposed to anxiety about corruption and its 
consequences.259  After all, the presence of native communities within and beyond 
                                                          
 
250
 Id. at 44. 
 
251
 Id. 
 
252
 POCOCK, supra note 229, at 527; Lutz, supra note 246, at 190, 192-93;  see also 
POCOCK, supra note 229, at 518 (noting that Federalist ideas about representative government 
were Hobbesian rather than Lockean). 
 
253
 BREWER, supra note 232, at 97. 
 
254
 POCOCK, supra note 229, at 527; Lutz, supra note 246, at 192-93. 
 
255
 POCOCK, supra note 229, at 527, 545; Lutz, supra note 246, at 192-93. 
 
256
 POCOCK, supra note 229, at 510. 
 
257
 Id. at 516-17. 
 
258
 Id. at 515-16. 
 
259
 Id. at 509. 
35Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
422 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:387 
 
colonial borders provided a ready analogue for the Germanic barbarians that 
emerged from the wilderness to sack the corrupted Roman Empire.260  And the 
combination of physical isolation from Great Britain and increasingly active 
attempts by the Crown to project imperial power across that divide only increased 
the colonists’ sense that American civic virtue lay besieged.261  Revolutionary 
intellectuals imagined that the political model of the free republic would prevent the 
overreaching that had corrupted the mother country.262   
The American Revolutionaries hoped that an aristocratic few would emerge 
naturally in post-colonial society.263  The colonies lacked an existing class of nobility 
because “an ancient aristocracy was hard to establish in a new society and a manorial 
nobility did not seem to thrive under settler conditions.”264  The consensus among 
American political thinkers was that any artificially created aristocracy would be a 
captive agent of the appointing governor.265  The obsequiousness of such a false 
aristocracy would render it incapable of providing the independent check on the one 
that republican theory demanded.266  When the natural aristocracy presupposed by 
republican theorists failed to emerge, however, it precipitated a crisis in American 
political thought.267   
Undergirding the classical conception of republican socio-political balance was 
the understanding that one’s property was the indicator of one’s class.  The 
Federalist response to the absence of aristocrats in the New World republic was to 
argue for an undifferentiated body politic governed on Lockean consensual 
principles.268  As we have seen, those principles reject any link between property 
ownership and civic capacity.269  Because the class deference inherent in classical-
republican virtue was absent from this model, the architects of the new national 
government anticipated the unrestrained expression of factional ambition by erecting 
structural safeguards to prevent the dominance of any one faction.270  Importantly, 
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“the capacity of this structure for absorbing and reconciling conflicting interests is 
without known limits.”271  Further, the separation of powers to address the needs of 
interest-group politics could be justified in familiar republican terms, allowing the 
American elite to deceive even themselves as to the sweep of their ideological 
transformation.272   
Thus, the American departure from the stratification, deference, and pre-
determined social roles of classical republicanism necessitated the investiture of all 
citizens with both civic identity and political opportunity as birthrights.  This 
recapitulation of classical republicanism set the stage for the Jacksonian democratic 
reforms that would eventually lead to universal suffrage.  Lockean consent theory 
had earlier proven essential to American justifications for the rebellion against the 
British Crown.  By turning again to Lockean consent theory to justify interest-group 
politics and resolve the crisis in republican political thought, the founders of the 
American republic struck a blow that would ultimately remove property as a 
precondition of political life.  As this intellectual history shows, the American 
democratic experiment did not emphasize the purported conjunction of property 
ownership and civic identity.  Rather, it refuted that connection in unequivocal 
terms. 
2. Property Rights, Natural Rights, and Natural Law 
Some eminent-domain opponents argue that private property is a natural right, 
implying that ownership rights are absolute.  Cicero defined natural law as “right 
reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands 
urge us to duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. . . .  This law cannot be 
contradicted by any other law, . . . [and] in all times and nations this universal law 
must for ever reign.”273  Senator Sam Brownback provides a typical property-as-
natural-right formulation: “Even before the existence of the United States, William 
Blackstone stated that ‘the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to 
the sacred and inviolable rights of private property.’”274 But if Blackstone’s 
inviolable private right is to garner the force of Cicero’s natural law, it must be 
universal law, applying to all societies in all historical periods. 
The nexus in the Anglo-American mind of property rights, personal liberty, and 
the opportunity for economic advancement has a long history, dating back at least to 
Magna Carta.275  In 1215, British nobles compelled King John to agree that he could 
not seize the lands or crops of his subjects without compensating them for their 
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losses.276  Thus, the compensation requirement has limited Anglo-American eminent 
domain for almost eight hundred years.  The length of a tradition, however, is 
insufficient to confer upon it the moral legitimacy of natural law.  For instance, 
slavery—practiced in America and its predecessor colonies for over two hundred 
years277—was grounded in a tradition dating back to ancient times.278  American 
slave owners justified the enslavement of Africans by denying the humanity of the 
enslaved population.279  Unchecked prejudice, not natural law, provided the 
theoretical framework for treating human slaves as property. 
In American legal theory, the very act of European discovery dispossessed 
Native Americans.280  But the European explorer planting his flag upon a desolate 
beachfront effects a dispossession every bit as violent as any seizure of a Briton’s 
lands or corn by the British monarch.281  To the extent that they bothered, Anglo-
American colonial theorists justified disregard for native title by citing the 
superiority of European agricultural cultivation over the natives’ more pastoral 
modes of existence.282  That assertion of superiority relies on utilitarian notions about 
productive land use, not any universal claim based upon natural law.283  As an ironic 
aside, eminent-domain opponents who cite both Locke and natural law should 
beware, as Locke’s writings unequivocally condone colonial expropriations of native 
real property.284   
The American colonists did not sense a contradiction between their claims 
against the British government and their treatment of other cultures.  The “natural 
rights” of the founding generation were their British constitutional rights under 
Blackstonian common law, rather than a set of universal rights derived from classical 
natural law.285  Justifying their resistance to the Crown as a Lockean withdrawal of 
consent following abuse of their historical rights, the Revolutionaries fought to 
restore their rights as Englishmen—not to usher in a new era of universal human 
rights.286  The genocidal treatment of Native Americans and the enslavement of 
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imported Africans presented no ideological contradiction for the colonists.  Those 
matters were outside the scope of the liberties that the revolutionaries fought so hard 
to redeem.287  Thus, while there certainly was some correspondence between patently 
British original rights and universal rights derived from natural law, there were 
important distinctions as well.  The European indifference to Native American land 
claims and the endorsement of chattel slavery in the New World undermine the 
moral absolutism of the natural-law argument against eminent domain in American 
cities. 
Libertarian assertions that property rights founded in natural law formed the 
centerpiece of the American constitutional project oversimplify the 
contemporaneous intellectual ferment.  And the violations of natural law at the 
inception of the Anglo-American property system in North America doom any effort 
to cloak American real-estate title with absolute immutability based on the 
universalist principles of natural law.  Moreover, the argument that natural rights 
derived from the English common law provide an inviolate right to property proves 
too much.  An inviolate right to property would render the Takings Clause 
superfluous, for compensation is unnecessary if government cannot take private 
property in the first place.  Accordingly, natural-law objections to public-purpose 
takings are also not well taken because they would curtail actual-use takings clearly 
within the powers granted by the Constitution.   
3. Property Rights and the Rule of Law 
Property-rights advocates argue that an unconditional right to private property is 
an essential characteristic of the rule of law.  Professor Eagle framed this point by 
saying that “[t]he rule of law is inconsistent with the notion that everyone’s property 
is up for grabs.”288  In her testimony before the House Subcommittee, Ms. Berliner 
implied that if some residents wish to remain in an area, the government has to let 
them.289  And Michael Cristofaro, one of dispossessed homeowners in New London, 
stated: 
In the end, it’s not about the money—it is the loss of choice.  With 
economic development in a free market, the property owner chooses 
whether or not to sell.  In a free market, the price is determined by what 
the market will bear.  Choice belongs both to the one selling—and the one 
buying.  By keeping the threat of eminent domain in the municipal 
“toolbox” of economic development, government takes away a 
fundamental right of its citizens to choose.290 
Emphasizing this theme of individual autonomy, Professor Eagle argued that, 
when interpreting the Takings Claus, the elision of public use, public benefit, and 
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public purpose “transmutes fee simple ownership into conditional ownership.  In 
effect, the individual . . . now becomes a tenant at will.”291   
Those who maintain that public-purpose takings circumvent the Fifth 
Amendment’s public-use requirement are saying that property is not relational.  This 
objection implicitly projects an anachronistically modern understanding of the 
public/private distinction backward into history.292  The objection also invokes the 
discredited Blackstonian myth of ownership as unqualified dominion.293  Even 
opponents of public-purpose takings concede that property rights, from whatever 
source derived, are not absolute.294  Throughout history, private ownership has 
conditioned—and been conditioned by—the owner’s relationship to the rest of 
society.295  Accordingly, Professor Eagle’s implicit equation of fee simple title and 
unqualified dominion proves too much because it suggests that condemnations ought 
to be banned outright.  Mr. Cristofaro’s emphasis on the potential for coercion 
likewise applies in all eminent-domain cases.   
But government can justifiably modify the rights of the freeholder when external 
costs reach a sufficient magnitude.  The government should mediate individual 
behavior when it poses externalities—by preventing realization of a public good or 
itself generating a negative externality—above a certain threshold.296  Admittedly, 
locating the boundary between public interest and private property is fraught with 
difficulty.297  But Ms. Berliner’s uncompromising insistence on the fulfillment of 
individual expectations, if it unduly compromises the public good, abuses the public 
fisc.  Indulgence of such abuse causes harm to the polity as a whole. 
C. The American Tradition Should Not Prevent Smart-Decline Takings 
Some opponents of eminent domain argue that public-purpose takings violate 
fundamental American values.298  Continuous growth and individual property 
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ownership are such vital elements of American self-understanding that some 
observers will regard wholesale decommissioning as antithetical to our defining 
political mythology.299  The national creation story sees physical expansion, 
economic growth, and individual property rights as central to public morals and 
democratic freedom.   
Federalist thinkers analyzing the nation-building project through the lens of 
classical republicanism solved the conundrum of the absent American aristocracy.  
They fused the Lockean notion that civic identity is independent of property 
ownership with a system of structural checks against interest-group factionalism.  
Revolutionary thinkers also recapitulated the societal role of property by suggesting 
that imperial corruption could be postponed indefinitely, even in the face of 
geographic expansion, by the broad distribution of property ownership among the 
citizens.300  The resultant agrarian republicanism combined with the millennialist and 
utopian strands of colonial thought to forge a powerful ideological impetus for 
westward expansion.301  By “ideological,” I mean deriving from “a partial vision of 
the world that appears to its proponents as well as to its victims as a universal 
vision.”302  The power of ideology explains how ideas about the way American 
society should be ordered—even if not accurate predictors of the social results that 
will flow from implementing those ideas—can motivate social action based on their 
apparent validity. 
A regularly expanding supply of previously unowned land is the easiest context 
in which to balance the possessory interests of existing owners with the ideological 
desire to expose current non-owners to the putatively moralizing effects of land 
ownership.303  In the late 1820s, American clergyman and frontier intellectual 
Timothy Flint coined the phrase “fee simple empire” to describe what he saw as the 
moral and aesthetic superiority of life on small Western farms.304  Flint thought that 
widespread Western property ownership inculcated a set of values superior to both 
                                                          
of Dr. Eni Foo, Ardmore, Pa.) (sharing that immigrant restaurant owners’ eminent domain 
experience undermined their belief in America as a “land of freedom and justice, free from 
fear”); id. at 63 (email from Jim Campano, Somerville, Mass.) (arguing that condemnation of 
occupied residential property for economic development is “un-American” and “akin to going 
back to the days of kings and royalty when they could just come in and throw you out on the 
street”); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 126 (testimony of Gopal K. Panday, Long Branch, 
N.J.) (asking Congress to stop politicians using eminent domain in contravention of “our 
‘Basic Entrenched Values’ and ‘Private Property’”); id. at 27 (testimony of Sen. Jon Kyl, 
Ariz.) (labeling private property “a bedrock of who we are” as Americans). 
 
299
 For a discussion of the role that growth plays in American self-image, see POCOCK, 
supra note 229, at 507. 
 
300
 Id. at 511. 
 
301
 Id. at 511-13. 
 
302
 Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 94 (1984).   
 
303
 For a graphical representation of the expanding-pie concept, see EPSTEIN, supra note 
242, at 4.  For additional discussion of the concept and its place in the American self-
understanding, see also POCOCK, supra note 229, at 528. 
 
304
 HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH 140, 
280 (1950) (quoting Timothy Flint, Book Review of Alexander Hill Everett’s AMERICA, in 1 
WESTERN MONTHLY REVIEW 169, 169-70 (July 1827)). 
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2010
428 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:387 
 
the amoral existence of harried, unpropertied Northern mill workers and the 
corrupted planter indolence of the Southern plantation system.305  Scholars have 
since used the phrase to describe the peculiarly American premise that the 
geographical expansion of individual property rights could preserve the moral 
character of a democratic polity.306   
The American colonial arrangement, with a comparatively fluid social order and 
vast natural resources, presented the tantalizing possibility that non-owners could 
acquire property without a redistribution of the lands and other wealth of existing 
owners.  This paradigm necessarily required negotiations with—or forcible 
dispossession of—the Native Americans previously occupying the land.307  Despite 
the anxieties incident to the clash between native and European culture, the 
attractiveness of the available economic opportunities helped populate the British 
colonies.308  And property played an essential role in the project of preserving the 
civic virtue of the new polity.  For instance, the free alienation of property was an 
essential and novel element of Revolutionary thought.  Noah Webster noted that 
property transfer was essential to preserving the virtuous dynamism of the fee simple 
empire, writing that “[a]n equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, 
constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the very soul of 
a republic.”309 
But with growth in American cities grinding to a halt and even reversing itself, 
the potential for amelioration of underlying material inequalities by way of an ever-
expanding pie evaporates.  Further, the present circumstances of poor homeowners 
in distressed parts of America’s urban core directly contradict the notion that 
property ownership leads to a virtuous prosperity.  If historical results suggest that 
property ownership fails to produce the political benefits ascribed to it, the prospect 
of such benefits, at least in situations where the failed promise is evident, should not 
be deployed to prevent efforts to remedy the consequences of our false hope.  There 
is nothing but our own ideological preconceptions to deny that smart decline is a 
viable response to our present circumstances.310  Acceptance of neutral or declining 
demand for urban land is jarringly unprecedented in the American consciousness, 
but need not remain so.  As Professors Popper and Popper note: 
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Our history and our planning have given us a sense that the U.S. 
population is on a permanent roll, that it will inevitably continue to 
increase nearly everywhere.  This belief has in it a strong element of 
myth. . . . [T]he American infatuation with growth has always meant 
overlooking an important chunk of reality. 311   
Fee simple empire, the American descendant of classical republicanism, is one 
variant of what Professor Robert W. Gordon has called evolutionary 
functionalism.312  By evolutionary functionalism, Professor Gordon means the 
overarching idea “that the natural and proper evolution of a society . . . is towards the 
type of liberal capitalism seen in the advanced Western nations . . . , and that the 
natural and proper function of a legal system is to facilitate such an evolution.”313  
The promise of fee simple empire breaks down in American cities precisely because 
of its excessively deterministic explanation of historical processes.314  By retaining 
historical notions of fee simple empire in our collective consciousness, we 
needlessly inhibit our ability to envision forward-thinking policy solutions to the 
property abandonment that is eviscerating our aging cities. 
D. Public-Purpose Takings—The Public-Policy Concerns 
Policy-based objections to public-purpose takings take three forms: objections to 
procedure, disavowal of benefit, and disputed costs.  All three concerns can be 
resolved through compensation reform and the adoption of a Kaldor-Hicks-
efficiency test for public use. 
1. Procedure-Focused Policy Objections 
Procedural objections focus on the private owner’s ability to rebut the 
government’s asserted justification for the condemnation.  They are grounded in the 
argument that the owner lacks sufficient opportunity to dispute the purported costs 
and benefits of the expropriation.  In some cases, the government’s abuse of the 
process can give its version of the costs and benefits an unfair rhetorical advantage.  
For instance, government officials sometimes deliberately obscure the planning 
process to reduce public participation.315  Condemning authorities can also make 
selective use of experts, disparaging the conclusions of independent studies that 
support the private-owners’ points of view.316  The city and the developer often agree 
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to the details of a development project before announcing the deal, rendering the 
subsequent public hearings perfunctory.317  When the planning authorities 
disempower private citizens in these ways, it can be hard for an individual owner to 
know where to turn for information and assistance.318  The U.S. Supreme Court 
resolved these concerns by requiring in Kelo that any development plan used to 
justify a public-purpose taking be the product of a participatory planning process.319 
Some observers criticize public-purpose takings because they disproportionately 
affect the poor, the elderly, and racial or ethnic minorities.320  These critics note that 
disadvantaged groups rarely participate in advance discussions about the decision to 
employ eminent domain, despite frequently being among the dispossessed.321  In 
addition to their absence from the planning process, these groups are ill-equipped to 
contest an eminent domain action.  As the NAACP’s Hilary O. Shelton noted, 
“Condemnation in low-income or predominantly minority neighborhoods is often 
easier to accomplish because these groups are less likely or are often unable to 
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contest the actions either politically or in our Nation’s courts.”322  But political 
disempowerment lurks in all eminent-domain scenarios, not just those involving 
public-purpose takings.  Statutory increases to the amount of compensation paid 
would both discourage municipalities from targeting the powerless and more 
equitably offset the burden of condemnation in those cases where municipalities 
used eminent domain. 
Perhaps the most common objection to eminent-domain procedures is that they 
impose excessive costs on individuals who wish to challenge the government’s 
action.323  First, attorney costs present an often-insurmountable obstacle for private 
challengers.  A property owner contesting the facial legitimacy of a condemnation 
collects no money if successful; the owner’s legal victory merely compels the 
government to stop its eminent-domain action.324  The absence of damages requires 
owners to fund their legal expenses directly, an option that may be beyond their 
means.  An owner who only litigates to obtain additional compensation might offer 
an attorney a percentage of any increased award.  But the economics of such 
engagements are not attractive to most attorneys.325  Some advocates have suggested 
that prevailing property owners should be granted a statutory right to recover 
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attorney fees.326  Statutory attorney fees, however, risk a flood of litigation.  
Idiosyncratic value awards force the government to fairly compensate the 
dispossessed owner, and a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency standard ensures that 
governments will not commence unjustified condemnations.  These solutions 
maximize the incentives for negotiated sales between owners and governments, 
thereby reducing the need for compulsory purchases in the first place.  Thus, these 
solutions reduce the risks associated with a statutory resolution of the attorney-fee 
challenge by reducing the instances in which the parties will resort to litigation. 
Standing problems also present considerable obstacles for property owners.  
Professor Eagle argues that federal courts wrongly delay standing for property 
claims couched in constitutional terms.327  For instance, a property owner cannot 
claim a constitutional violation until the city formally initiates eminent-domain 
proceedings, even when the city announces the possibility of eminent domain years 
in advance.  In addition to being unable to prospectively challenge the legitimacy of 
the taking itself, owners cannot contest the adequacy of a compensation award until 
they have received confirmation of the putatively inadequate amount from the 
condemning authority.328   
The resulting temporal uncertainty presents affected property owners with a 
Hobson’s choice about the maintenance of their property.329  If they do not invest, 
they risk foreclosure and building-code enforcement because the mere 
announcement of the government’s intent to use eminent domain does not suspend 
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any time during or after the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ completion of a flood control 
project, leaving the affected property owners to contemplate whether to repair the flood 
damage while facing the prospect of eminent domain for a ten- to fifteen-year timeframe); id. 
at 42 (testimony of Robert Blue, Hollywood, Cal.) (noting that the prospect of eminent 
domain has discouraged his family from making investments in their business or its premises 
for two years). 
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the owner’s mortgage, property-tax, or maintenance obligations.  But if an owner 
does invest and the threatened seizure occurs, current compensation law makes no 
allowance for the investment or attempted use that the condemnation cuts short.   
When Kelo was before the Connecticut Supreme Court, Justice Peter T. Zarella 
dissented from the majority’s approval of New London’s condemnations.330  Justice 
Zarella argued that the government should have to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the purported benefits were likely to materialize.331  By putting the 
condemning authority to its proof at the outset, a clear-and-convincing evidentiary 
standard coupled with a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency test for public use enables courts to 
quickly map the dispositive issues and take the evidence necessary for their 
resolution.332  Thus, armed with an effective rule of decision, courts could grant 
standing earlier and alleviate a significant financial burden on individuals 
challenging condemnations.   
2. Benefit-Focused Policy Objections 
Even in instances where fair procedures are scrupulously observed, critics note 
that government officials frequently overvalue the projected economic gains from 
public projects.333  Despite lofty promises of economic stimulus and job creation, 
economic-development projects involving eminent domain often underperform.334  
Eminent-domain opponents argue that economic-development projects can be done 
without employing eminent domain at all.335  Critics also insist that smaller 
economic-development projects—which are less likely to need eminent domain for 
land assembly—are more likely to succeed.336  In some cases, cities use eminent 
                                                          
 
330
 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 574-602 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., 
dissenting in part), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 
331
 Id. at 596. 
 
332
 For a fuller discussion of the judicial mechanics of this proposal, see infra Part IV.A. 
 
333
 See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 30 (written response of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, 
George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va. to a question submitted by Sen. John 
Cornyn, Tex.); see generally Louis De Alessi, Implications of Property Rights for Government 
Investment Choices, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 13 (1969). 
 
334
 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 143 (prepared statement of Elaine J. Mittleman, 
Falls Church, Va.) (observing that economic-development benefits are frequently overstated); 
S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 39 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute for Justice, 
Washington, D.C.) (noting that Toledo, Ohio condemned 83 homes and 16 businesses in 1999 
to facilitate expansion of DaimlerChrysler automotive plant only to see significantly less than 
expected job growth); see also id. at 102 (testimony of Dorothy E. Littrell, Ogden, Utah) 
(noting that Ogden, Utah has debts of $76 million on projects that failed to live up to 
economic-development expectations); id. at 90 (prepared statement of  Institute for Justice, 
Arlington, Va.) (observing that economic-development benefits are frequently overstated). 
 
335
 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 131(letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New 
London, Conn.) (noting that, while his home was ostensibly needed to create a four-lane 
access road to the new Pfizer complex and other to-be-determined development, the existing 
two-lane road “had previously easily handled traffic from the much larger Naval Underwater 
Sound Lab”); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 90 (prepared statement of Institute for Justice, 
Arlington, Va.). 
 
336
 See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 77 (testimony of Don & Lynn Farris, 
Lakewood, Ohio) (suggesting that smaller projects are less risky and better engage citizens as 
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domain for a project despite a successful private project nearby that has no coerced 
land sales.337  In other cases, the developer never builds the end use that ostensibly 
justified the condemnation.338  Furthermore, the use of eminent domain to attract 
companies pits communities against one another, meaning that the loss of tax base in 
another—perhaps equally distressed—community offsets the economic benefit 
realized by the condemning authority.339  Business relocation decisions are distorted 
when government subsidy—including low-cost land assembly through eminent 
domain—encourages businesses to relocate to areas that are not naturally 
advantageous for the company.340   
Professor Richard A. Epstein doubts that government officials can be trusted to 
set aside personal motives and quash high-profile proposals that lack true social 
benefits.341  Public officials frequently overinvest in projects to burnish their 
image.342  Eminent domain should not be used to execute projects that, while 
creating the impression of bold leadership, produce only a marginal net social 
benefit.  Such projects are not Kaldor-Hicks efficient and would be barred if courts 
                                                          
agents of community improvement); id. at 43 (testimony of Robert Blue, Hollywood, Cal.) 
(citing local newspaper article stating that smaller projects are more likely to succeed). 
 
337
 See, e.g., id. at 58-59 (letter from Bart Didden, Port Chester, N.Y.) (stating that Port 
Chester, N.Y. was condemning his land, despite his signed lease and approved building 
permits to construct a new CVS drugstore, so that the village could convey the land to a 
“preferred developer” who planned to install a Walgreens drugstore on the property); id. at 42 
(testimony of Robert Blue, Hollywood, Cal.) (noting that the property owner across the street 
is pursuing a comparably-sized redevelopment project with no government subsidy, including 
no eminent domain). 
 
338
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 74 (email from Leon Howlett, Glendale, Ky.) (noting 
that, after assembling 1,500 adjacent acres for a Hyundai factory, county condemned his 110-
acre farm—only to see Hyundai opt for a site in Alabama); id. at 68 (email from “Daniel,” 
Rock Hill, Mo.) (recounting Rock Hill, Mo. aldermen’s designation of neighborhood as 
blighted with no subsequent redevelopment despite passage of nearly a decade and 
condemnation on another occasion—purportedly to build community center—that resulted in 
sale to private developer); id. at 23 (prepared statement of Michael Cristofaro, New London, 
Conn.) (describing New London’s expropriation of his parents’ first home for a sea wall that 
was never built); id. at 10 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute for Justice, Washington, 
D.C.) (“The homes [in New London, Conn.] are—some of them are being taken for something 
or another.  No one knows what.  Some of the homes are being taken for an office the 
developer already [has] said it’s not going to build.”); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 39 
(testimony Dana Berliner, Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C.) (noting lack of construction 
activity at condemned New Cassel, N.Y. site that church congregation intended to build new 
church on, forcing church to rent elsewhere for years). 
 
339
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 31 (written response of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George 
Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va. to a question submitted by Sen. John 
Cornyn, Tex.); id. at 18 (statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School 
of Law, Arlington, Va.) 
 
340
 Id. at 17 (statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, 
Arlington, Va.). 
 
341
 EPSTEIN, supra note 242, at 7-18; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the 
Compensation Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN).   
 
342
 De Alessi, supra note 333, at 19-20. 
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interpreted the public-use requirement as requiring such efficiency.  Officials 
sponsoring municipal-contraction proposals prove their own humility by 
acknowledging the strategic value of retreat.  Rapacious or megalomaniacal public 
officials are unlikely to pursue a wholesale-decommissioning strategy because it 
lacks both glamour and immediate profit.  Also, the cost-savings justification for 
smart-decline takings is less prone to overstatement than inherently more speculative 
revenue-enhancing proposals because the municipality’s historical capital 
expenditure and operating expense records are readily available. 
In the condemnation context, a pervasive conflict of interest heightens the risk of 
bad-faith governmental behavior.  The opportunity to exercise eminent domain in 
furtherance of projects that produce collective benefits tempts local government 
officials to downplay their obligation to safeguard the interests of each individual 
citizen.343  As Senator Jeff Sessions remarked, “The city, let’s be frank, has a conflict 
of interest.  The city is going to get a lot more property tax, and the county and the 
State will if you have got an expensive home or an expensive development there 
than a middle-class home.”344  Professor Eagle concurred, noting: 
The path of least resistance for state legislators is to avoid making hard 
choices concerning taxes, social need, and among programs competing for 
public funding.  It is easier to encourage distressed cities to profit from 
condemning homes and small businesses, assembling their small lots into 
large parcels more attractive to commercial development, and transferring 
these at nominal cost as a subsidy for businesses that might bring jobs and 
taxes.  In a real sense, then, condemnation for economic development is 
of direct financial benefit to the State.”345   
                                                          
 
343
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 18 (statement Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.) (noting that the condemning authority’s tendency 
to focus on the logic and quality of the deal, as between that authority and the private 
developer, ignores the inadequacy of compensation received by individual condemnees). 
 
344
 Id. at 25 (testimony of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ala.); see also H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 
59 (prepared statement of American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, D.C.) (suggesting 
that states’ interest in maximizing local revenues will limit their interest in denying local 
governments an opportunity to increase the value of the property tax base by discouraging 
eminent domain abuse); id. at 101 (testimony of  Dorothy E. Littrell, Ogden, Utah) (arguing 
that redevelopment agencies provide an opportunity for elected officials to don a different hat 
and avoid accountability to the electorate); id. at 79 (statement, Dan Freier, Minneapolis, 
Minn.) (arguing that mayor’s support of eminent domain that will adversely affect affordable 
housing is driven by the mayor’s desire for a marquee project to support his upcoming run for 
a Minnesota State Senate seat); id. at 17-18 (statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.) (noting that cities and states, because of their 
dependence upon tax revenues, have an incentive to be obsequious toward private 
development partners). 
 
345
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 65 (testimony Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.); see also id. at 13 (statement of  Hilary O. Shelton, 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington, D.C.) (noting the 
self-interest that motivates state and local governments to “replace areas of low property value 
with those with higher property values”); id. at 7 (statement of  Susette Kelo, New London, 
Conn.) (arguing that taking of her home and others was simply to increase municipal tax 
revenues). 
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Justice Sandra Day O’Connor argued in her Kelo dissent that it is hard to 
separate redevelopment-taking gains that accrue to the city from those that benefit 
the private developer.346   
Used wantonly, eminent domain exposes the government to accusations that the 
development proposal is merely an expression of preference for certain land uses.347  
As Mr. Shelton observed, “Many studies contend that the goal of many of these 
displacements is to segregate and maintain the isolation of the poor, minority, and 
otherwise outcast populations.”348  A related concern is that eminent domain 
constitutes a reverse wealth transfer from the less fortunate to those at the top of the 
local political and economic hierarchy.349  Justice O’Connor’s oft-quoted remark 
eloquently conjures the image of a grasping government bent on reverse wealth 
transfers: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property.  Nothing is to 
prevent the state from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a 
shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”350  The Institute for Justice warns that 
eminent domain for economic development opens the door to land speculation by the 
city itself.351  All too often the actions of local condemning authorities confirm these 
                                                          
 
346
 Id. at 70 (testimony Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, 
Arlington, Va.) (quoting O’Connor’s Kelo dissent at 545 U.S. at 502); see also id. at 17 
(statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va.). 
 
347
 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 69 (prepared statement of Ken Taylor, Wayne, 
Pa.) (asserting that public-purpose takings constitute “a financially-motivated class, [sic] 
war”); id. at  61 (prepared statement of Carla J. Zambelli, Haverford, Pa.) (calling public-
purpose takings “economic segregation and class warfare”); id. at 59 (prepared statement of 
American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, D.C.) (noting that agricultural use, because it 
generates a lower return on investment in land, is more vulnerable to eminent domain for 
economic development); id. at 42 (testimony of Michael Cristofaro, New London, Conn.) 
(arguing that the New London redevelopment plan sought the replacement of poor and 
middle-class homeowners by a residential elite); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 7 (statement of 
Susette Kelo, New London, Conn.) (arguing that the New London redevelopment plan sought 
the replacement of poor and middle-class homeowners by a residential elite).  Notably, good 
national data regarding the prevalence of eminent domain was not available when Congress 
was considering legislative responses to Kelo.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT 
TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, EMINENT DOMAIN: INFORMATION ABOUT ITS USES AND 
EFFECT ON PROPERTY OWNERS AND COMMUNITIES IS LIMITED 13-14 (2006) (GAO-07-28), 
available at www.gao.govcgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-28; see also Jesse Saginor, Eminent 
Domain and Its Use as an Economic Development Tool 279 (2006) (unpublished Ph. D. 
dissertation, Cleveland State University), http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1172122571 
&sid=10&Fmt=6&clientId=3951&RQT=309&VName=PQD&cfc=1. 
 
348
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 12 (statement of Hilary O. Shelton, National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington, D.C.).   
 
349
 Id.; see also id. at 69 (testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University 
School of Law, Arlington, Va.); id. at 26 (testimony of Sen. Jon Kyl, Ariz.); id. at 17 
(statement of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va.).  
 
350
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  For 
favorable citations to Justice O’Connor’s remark, see, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 4 
(statement of Sen. John Cornyn, Tex.). 
 
351
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 88 (prepared statement  of Institute for Justice, Arlington, 
Va.).  
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fears.352  Nowhere is it clearer than in the accusations of reverse wealth transfer that 
the core injustice in most eminent-domain abuse cases is a compensation problem, 
not a scope-of-the-takings-power problem.  Requiring condemning authorities to 
adequately compensate the affected owners renders accusations of wealth transfer 
untenable.  The owners’ wealth will change its form, but the overall value of that 
wealth remains the same. 
Another common charge against public-purpose takings is that they constitute a 
conspiracy of government officials and private elites to dispossess ordinary 
citizens.353  As Professor Eagle observed about Justice Stevens’ inclusionary 
planning process in Kelo: 
                                                          
 
352
 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 69 (prepared statement of Stanford Cramer, 
Harrisburg, Pa.); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 137 (testimony of Daniel P. Regenold, 
Cincinnati, Ohio) (noting that Evendale, Ohio employed the threat of eminent domain to gain 
control over owners because it was advised that “everyone was doing it”); Id. at 44 (statement 
of  Linda Brnicevic & Cameron McEwen, Bound Brook, N.J.) (recounting story of Bound 
Brook, N.J., where city officials responded to the worst flood on record by commencing 
eminent domain to replace the flooded residential and commercial buildings with “a private 
developer’s office park”); Id. at 37 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute for Justice, 
Washington, D.C.) (arguing that Kelo has only encouraged governments to take property for 
private development and listing examples).  
 
353
 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (news article submitted by Bart Didden, 
Port Chester, N.Y.) (submitting newspaper article detailing the unseemly connections between 
village officials, a private developer, and local attorneys condemning land for economic-
development project); id. at 131 (letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New London, Conn.) 
(claiming, as a homeowner, that “a Pfizer executive’s wife organized the theft of my 
neighborhood”); id. at 103 (testimony of Brian Calvert, Derby, Conn.) (accusing “multi 
billionaire company” of colluding with government to use eminent domain to obtain land at 
below-market prices); id. at 100 (letter from Carl & Arleen Yacobacci, Derby, Conn.) 
(complaining that condemning authority allowed developer to miss several planning deadlines 
while significantly altering project scope); id. at 77 (email from Nick Ericson, Duluth, Minn.) 
(accusing Duluth Housing Redevelopment Authority of preferential letting of contracts in 
connection with public housing at private homeowner’s expense); id. at 63 (prepared 
statement of Dr. Eni Foo, Ardmore, Pa.) (relating opinion that township’s efforts to condemn 
their restaurant was intended to convey title to “a powerful and rich developer”); id. at 62 
(email from Rosa Sutton Holmes, Riviera, Fla.) (bemoaning the taking of a close friend’s 
property in West Palm Beach, Fla. for the benefit of other private owners, CSX 
Transportation, and the State of Florida without proper payment); S. Hearings, supra note 63, 
at 138 (testimony of John Seravalli, Daytona Beach, Fla.) (complaining that St. Louis, Mo. 
ground lessees made sizable contributions to local politicians in exchange for condemnation 
of ground lessor’s underlying land and title transfer to ground lessees); id. 124-25 (letter from  
Barbara J. Morley, Lincoln, Neb.) (complaining of expropriation to benefit “the politically 
powerful” who delayed and then constructed a failed low-income housing project, despite 
owner’s significant plans for redevelopment and fresh investment); id. at 103 (testimony of 
Bruce R. MacCloud, Long Branch, N.J.) (reporting city’s selection of private developer—
subsequently imprisoned for bribery and extortion of public officials elsewhere—as the 
beneficiary of redevelopment plan that employed eminent domain extensively); id. at 83 
(testimony of Michael B. Hetzel, Shady Cove, Or.) (reporting developer’s use of political 
connections to expropriate twenty-year owner’s property to create dead-end street into gated 
residential subdivision despite owner’s voluntary offer to sell and subsequent thirty-percent 
price reduction); id. at 81-82 (letter from Wright Gore III, Freeport, Tex.) (reporting that well-
connected developer never approached waterfront property owners with offer for voluntary 
purchase, instead inducing city officials to employ eminent domain); id. at 77 (statement of 
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This description seems somewhat na[ï]ve.  In most communities, political, 
commercial and financial elites are personally well-acquainted and 
connected through a multitude of social, civic and professional 
relationships.  One hand washes the other.  This does not necessarily 
imply corruption or overt favoritism.  Nevertheless, in the nature of 
things, the well-connected have a decided advantage.  For these groups, 
the raw material of both civic and personal gain is often the property of 
the less well-off and less well-connected.354   
This sort of abusive civic conspiracy can arise as easily in a direct-government-
use, common carrier, or blight-remediation taking as in an economic-development 
taking.355  Once again, including subjective value in the amount of compensation 
paid provides a solution by reducing the profitability of collusive land deals. 
3. Cost-Focused Policy Objections 
Cost-centered arguments against public-purpose takings focus on either the social 
costs of rendering property rights ephemeral or the inadequacy of the compensation 
granted to the affected property owner.  Individual fairness is central to my proposed 
resolution of the eminent-domain controversy.  Accordingly, I postpone its treatment 
until the full discussion of that solution in Part IV of this Note,356 addressing only the 
social-cost objections here among the policy considerations associated with the 
scope of the public-use requirement.  A common pragmatic objection to eminent 
domain is that security of ownership encourages individual owners to husband scarce 
                                                          
Don & Lynn Farris, Lakewood, Ohio) (reporting that mayor and private developer signed 
memorandum of understanding to use eminent domain to support developer’s project without 
public discussion); id. at 56 (statement of Dr. Mark T. Dahl, Afton, Minn.) (suggesting that 
subdivision developer and former planning commissioner requested mayor and city council to 
condemn land of other private owners to provide an intended subdivision with a second access 
road); id. at 49 (opening statement of Sen. Sam Brownback, Kan.) (noting that Norwood, Ohio 
initiated condemnation action using a blight study commissioned by the developer who stood 
to take title to the properties after their condemnation). 
 
354
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 17 (statement of  Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.); see also H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 110-11 
(prepared statement of Dr. Roger Pilon, Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.); S. Hearings, supra 
note 63, at 69 (testimony Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, 
Arlington, Va.); id. at 30 (written response of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University 
School of Law, Arlington, Va. to a question submitted by Sen. John Cornyn, Tex.) (describing 
how private parties can identify “arbitrage opportunities” in real estate markets and extract 
excess value through an opaque partnership with government involving eminent domain and 
subsequent aggregation of parcels); id. at 8 (statement of  Susette Kelo, New London, Conn.) 
(asking Congress to send a message to “special interests” that benefit from eminent domain 
abuse). 
 
355
 See, e.g., S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 127 (statement of Daryl Penner, Kansas City, 
Mo.) (decrying condemnation of 70-year-old tuxedo-rental store with large downtown 
clientele and significant square footage to make way for new sports arena and 18-story 
corporate headquarters favored by civic elites); id. at 126 (testimony of Gopal K. Panday, 
Long Branch, N.J.) (arguing that city’s blight designation is a falsehood designed to transfer 
private property to the hands of a favored developer). 
 
356
 See infra Part IV.C.1. 
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resources and to deploy those resources in value-maximizing ways.357  Eminent 
domain arguably imposes demoralization costs on the community by destroying the 
incentive to productivity that secure private ownership generates.358  As Mr. Shelton 
observed: 
The incentive to invest in one’s community financially and otherwise 
directly correlates with the confidence in one’s ability to realize the fruit 
of such efforts.   
 
By broadening the permissible uses of eminent domain in a way that is 
not limited by specific criteria, many minority neighborhoods will be at 
increased risk of having property taken, and there will be even less 
incentive to engage in community-building and improvement.359 
It is important to recall that wholesale decommissioning is economically 
justifiable only where the husbandry and useful employment of urban land has 
largely ceased.360  Used judiciously, eminent domain in response to urban 
abandonment is more likely to spur investment than to retard it.   
Manhattan’s colonial history provides a useful example of how eminent domain 
can catalyze productive investment.  New York’s unique colonial charter gave the 
municipal corporation control over significant real-estate holdings.361  This control 
became a major source of municipal power and the management of its real estate 
became the principal activity of colonial city government.362  In its humble early 
years, New York City granted land to private citizens with an understanding that the 
city would repossess the property if the recipient failed to either develop the property 
as required or maintain the improvements on an ongoing basis.363  This creative use 
of land grants and eminent domain mobilized private enterprise toward certain 
                                                          
 
357
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 32 (7th ed. 2007). 
 
358
 Michelman, supra note 31, at 1165; see also H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 75 
(prepared statement of Rosemary Cubas, Philadelphia, Pa.) (arguing that eminent domain 
discourages low-income communities trying to improve their surroundings); id. at 73 
(prepared statement of Cristina Huerta Rodriguez, Ogden, Utah) (expressing hesitancy to 
make desired improvements such as planting a garden, interior painting, and installing new 
carpet because of uncertainty regarding their continued ownership); id. at 71 (email from John 
& Barbara Bernwell, St. Louis, Mo.) (decrying uncertainty generated by Rock Hill, Mo. 
eminent domain action as the cause of prevarication as to whether or not they should build a 
deck and wheelchair lift to assist the handicapped husband in entering and leaving the home); 
S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 76 (testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.) (characterizing eminent domain for economic 
development as “socially demoralizing”); id. at 42 (testimony of Robert Blue, Hollywood, 
Cal.) (noting that the prospect of eminent domain has discouraged his family from making 
investments in their business or its premises for two years). 
 
359
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 13 (statement of  Hilary O. Shelton, National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington, D.C.).   
 
360
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 34. 
 
361
 HARTOG, supra note 229, at 21-23. 
 
362
 Id. at 33-34, 43. 
 
363
 Id. at 51-52. 
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desired economic activities, particularly the development of public infrastructure 
such as streets and wharfs.364  Reinforcing the city government’s stewardship role, 
colonial New York could repossess its waterlot grants if the owner failed to develop 
and maintain the property in a manner beneficial to the community as a whole.365     
An emphasis on productive use as a justification for ownership reinforces the 
understanding of America as a democratic meritocracy founded on personal 
responsibility and hard work.366  Professor Michelman called this theory of property 
a “social functionary” approach.367  As he noted, “an owner viewed as a social 
functionary seems to have no moral claim [to property]. . . .  The justification for his 
ownership is his functional, not his personal merit.  His province is to husband, 
cultivate, and manage in the interest of all.”368  If landowners know that fallow urban 
property might be subject to seizure, they will be more likely to use the land 
productively themselves or sell it to someone who will.  At the same time, the 
constitutional requirement of just compensation for any taking redeems for them the 
personal wealth that the property represents in their hands.  Wholesale 
decommissioning produces social-functionary benefits at the community level, as 
well.  The strategy geographically concentrates those parties who are willing to 
invest in urban markets.369  This concentration will foster synergies between private 
parties and allow government to support those parties at lower cost.370 
IV. SMART DECLINE, JUST COMPENSATION, AND KALDOR-HICKS EFFICIENCY 
Eminent-domain abuse is real.  Unfortunately, that abuse is not limited to public-
purpose takings.  Considering eminent domain in the smart-decline context deflates 
obfuscatory rhetoric and reframes ossified debates about public-purpose takings.  
The adoption of a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency test will focus judicial attention on a 
comparison between the gains to society from the taking and its harm to individual 
owners.  Combining this focus with an insistence on full economic recovery by the 
dispossessed owners will prevent eminent-domain abuse, regardless of the intended 
subsequent use of the land. 
A. Public Use, Judicial Competence, and a Proposed Solution 
In one glaring instance of eminent-domain abuse, the Susquehanna Area 
Regional Airport Authority sought to condemn the business property of Stanford 
Cramer, a private airport-parking operator at the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania airport.371  
                                                          
 
364
 Id. 
 
365
 Id. 
 
366
 But see S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 41 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute for 
Justice, Washington, D.C.) (contending that eminent domain contradicts American values of 
hard work and independence). 
 
367
 See generally Michelman, supra note 31, at 1206-08. 
 
368
 Id. at 1207. 
 
369
 Shrinking Cities, supra note 7, at 34-35. 
 
370
 Id. 
 
371
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 69 (prepared statement of Stanford Cramer, Harrisburg, 
Pa.). 
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Ostensibly, the Airport Authority needed the private operator’s property for “airport 
purposes” or “for a cargo facility and airport repair area,” but one inevitable 
consequence of the condemnation would be to establish a parking monopoly for the 
airport-owned parking facility.372  In a vivid illustration of the conflict-of-interest 
problem that permeates this area of the law, the Airport Authority board voted on 
whether to condemn property.373  The taking in this instance is a direct-government-
use taking, not a public-purpose taking, but the odor of injustice hangs as heavily 
here as in any other case.  As the property owner put it, “Although the [Kelo] ruling 
does not directly impact my case, it has done so indirectly.  The ruling has put a 
spotlight on all eminent domain cases and how unfair the process can be.”374   
Consider also Daryl Penner’s case in Kansas City, Missouri, where eminent 
domain forced his tuxedo-rental business to exchange large quarters in a 
competitively advantageous downtown location for premises at a distant mall.375  
Despite being subsequently used for economic redevelopment, the city seized Mr. 
Penner’s land in a blight-remediation taking, not a Kelo-style economic-
redevelopment taking.376   
Among the myriad stories of eminent-domain abuse that emerged in the wake of 
Kelo, none presents a more poignant argument for the subjective value of land than 
Mississippi landowner Mark Bryant’s letter to Congress.  His plaintive request is so 
rich with troublesome valuation problems that it is worth quoting at length: 
Our family owns a tract of land that has been in our family for 
generations.  My father had inherited this land from his mother who had 
inherited it from her parents.  The foundation stones of the log cabin 
occupied by my great-grandparents still remain on the property 
underneath a magnolia tree that is one of the largest most people have 
ever seen.  It has been my dream that one day I would build a house on 
that property for my family.  That dream is now destroyed.   
 
An oil company [told us they were planning a pipeline] through our 
property.  We informed them at the time that we were not interested in 
selling the land or in granting an easement.  They told us that if we didn’t 
agree, they could take the land by eminent domain.  Some other families 
in the area did not want to give up their land either, but gave into [sic] 
coercion and the threat of eminent domain court proceedings which they 
could ill afford.   
 
My family and I chose to try and fight the effort, . . . We knew that this 
company’s pipeline was not a public utility, and the only ones who would 
benefit from this venture would be the company’s stockholders. . . . Our 
attempt to force the company to prove “public use” was futile. . . .    
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 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 127 (letter from Daryl Penner, Kansas City, Mo.). 
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We believe that this taking was unnecessary, that this company modified 
or changed the route of this pipeline to avoid other properties prior to 
bringing their legal proceedings against us, even through they denied in 
court that they could not [sic] change the route for anyone.  It is believed 
that the company favored the well-connected in determining the final 
route of this pipeline.  The route does not cross the state in a straight line, 
but zig-zags across the countryside, avoiding some properties entirely, for 
no apparent reason.   
 
My father served in this nation’s military and retired to our farm in 
Mississippi to raise three sons on land that he hoped to leave to them.  My 
mother, his widow, is 77 years old and had hoped to spend the twilight 
years of her life knowing that this land would pass to her sons to build 
their homes on.  I cannot describe how heartbroken she was when she 
realized that the old magnolia tree would be cut down, and that the 
ancestral home site would be wiped away by bulldozers.  My two brothers 
and I have also served this country and had hopes of raising our families 
on this land.  That won’t happen for me and my family.  The place where 
I had planned on building a home, the best part of the property, will have 
a pipeline running through it, and the “just compensation” for losing this 
dream of a future home is not enough to buy a similar tract of land with 
such an ideal home site somewhere else.  My father, my brothers, and I 
wore uniforms and protected this nation, believing that this nation’s 
government would, in turn, protect our rights.  We were mistaken.   
 
The legal system called us “defendants,” yet we had done no wrong to be 
accused of, except that we had resisted the will of powerful men.  Our 
land had been “condemned,” yet there was no slum.  The land was 
plentiful with trees, many planted by hand by my family, and wild game.   
 
This experience has left us with no faith in our legal system and no 
confidence in our government or our laws.  Our government has given the 
power of eminent domain to private entities whose only god is money and 
whose only motive is profit.377 
Mr. Bryant’s letter recapitulates all of the major objections to eminent domain.  
He is the quintessential sympathetic owner.  First, he frames his plea in compelling 
fashion.  His plainspoken exposition of the issues lends his viewpoint credibility.  He 
lays out a clear and rational claim to idiosyncratic value, touching on the family’s 
husbandry of the land and the sentimental value of the homestead.  Simultaneously, 
Mr. Bryant employs a mystical tone that subtly invokes sacred symbols.  The image 
of the expansive magnolia tree shading the ancestral cornerstone gives physicality to 
his dream of eventually building his own home on the site.  Mr. Bryant also 
characterizes his adversaries as disciplines of Mammon, aligning himself 
allegorically with the Christ that threw the money-changers from the temple.  He 
also poignantly juxtaposes his family’s military service for the common good with 
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an implied vision of eminent domain as a betrayal ostensibly in furtherance of that 
common good. 
Having established a rapport with the reader, Mr. Bryant skillfully presents the 
eminent-domain action as an affront to human dignity.  The condemnation disturbed 
his previously settled expectations regarding possession and use.  Again, he 
particularizes the loss imposed on the family with a vision of bulldozers plowing up 
the ancient foundation and felling the cherished magnolia tree.  In Mr. Bryant’s case, 
the offense is compounded by the indignity that a proud and innocent man feels at 
being labeled a defendant.  Most egregiously, the condemnation detrimentally 
impacts the family, particularly his elderly and widowed mother.   
Amplifying his grievance, Mr. Bryant asserts that the condemning authority has 
unclean hands.  “Powerful men” had the ear of government and were lined up 
against this family.  Mr. Bryant advances the notion that some owners had sufficient 
political clout to influence the pipeline’s route, and he does so in terms that convey 
his frustration at not being able to uncover and foil the scheme.  He closes by 
accusing the government of breaking its obligation to honor the best aspirations of 
individual citizens in exchange for their allegiance.  The reader is left with a distinct 
sense that this property owner has been wronged. 
Mr. Bryant adroitly delegitimized the condemnation that his family suffered.  But 
the effectiveness of his narrative critically depends on a compelling set of underlying 
facts.  Jurors understand ancestral homesteads and multigenerational ownership and 
can put a price on those things.  Jurors can also discern undue political influence, 
evaluate the obligation of government to serve the governed, and discount the 
government’s version of social utility appropriately.  In Mr. Bryant’s case, it is likely 
that a jury would assign a large dollar amount to his assertions of idiosyncratic 
value.  Accordingly, under the legal test that I propose, only an exceptionally 
beneficial project with little prospect of success in any other location would produce 
enough net economic benefit to make an expropriation of Mr. Bryant’s land an 
optimizing transaction in Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency terms.  The tragedy of Mr. 
Bryant’s story is that he lost his property in exchange for inadequate compensation 
and to a land use that did not benefit society.  Preventing future injustices of this sort 
requires just-compensation reform and a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency standard to 
determine what constitutes public use.   
In Kelo, Justice Stevens declined to adopt Justice Zarella’s clear-and-convincing 
evidentiary standard,378 worrying that it would draw the federal judiciary into 
“‘empirical debates over the wisdom of takings.’”379  But the judicial branch—and 
particularly the trial jury—is in a far better position than any executive agency or 
legislative body to evaluate the credibility of the parties’ claims.  Executive and 
legislative actors must formulate prospective rules without the ballast of a specific 
fact situation, whereas the judiciary can heuristically resolve eminent-domain 
challenges on a case-by-case basis.   
A burden-shifting approach would incorporate Kaldor-Hicks efficiency into a 
judicial paradigm that simultaneously tests the legitimacy of the government’s 
proposed action and the reasonableness of the owner’s asserted idiosyncratic value.  
First, the government should have the burden of demonstrating that the challenged 
                                                          
 
378
 See supra text accompanying notes 329-30. 
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 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488 (quoting Midkiff v. Haw. Hous. Auth., 
467 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1984)).   
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condemnation will move the community closer to Professor Hicks’ optimized 
economic condition.  To do so, the government will need to posit some dollar 
amount as the compensation due to the complaining owner.  If the government 
shows clearly and convincingly that the taking increases economic optimization at its 
posited compensation amount, the burden then shifts to the owner to contest that 
compensation amount.  Owners might offer objective evidence, such as alternate 
appraisals of fair-market value, and subjective value, such as explanations of any 
idiosyncratic value.  Then, the jury would weigh the credibility of the objective and 
subjective evidence as it would in any personal-injury case.  Although the jury 
process will not be perfect, cities and owners presently argue the merits in the media, 
with no pressure other than public opinion to force the government to accept 
reasonable compromises.  Juries can harness the common sense of the community to 
evaluate governments’ claims of purported benefit and owners’ claims of subjective 
value.  This, the collective wisdom of the jury opposes the coercive power of the 
State. 
The opposing risks of a grasping government and a holdout owner are present 
whether the proposed taking is to erect a new city hall, build a public highway, clear 
title to a nuisance-causing abandoned building, or decommission a neighborhood.  
Direct-government-use, common-carrier, and blight-remediation takings all bring the 
same opportunities for abuse.  An affront to individual dignity or public subsidy of 
an unneeded project is neither more nor less likely in these areas than in the 
economic-development-takings context.   
For instance, critics charge that the power of eminent domain encourages cities to 
browbeat landowners on price.380  This perverse incentive exists regardless of the 
purported reasons for the condemnation.  Mark Bryant’s case did not involve a 
public-purpose taking, but rather a common-carrier taking to benefit a private 
natural-gas-distribution company.  In another instance of common-carrier eminent-
domain abuse, a different natural-gas-distribution company employed threats of 
eminent domain—and numerous other questionable tactics—in an effort to install a 
potentially profitable pipeline in rural Tennessee that was arguably unnecessary for 
the public good.381  In both situations, the property owners did not face a Kelo-style 
economic-redevelopment taking.  Rather, they faced a common-carrier taking to 
benefit a publicly-regulated utility.  The prevalence of the “bogus blight” cases also 
illustrates the difficulty of a priori legal definition of public use.382 
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 See, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 50, 51 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute for 
Justice, Washington, D.C.); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 91 (prepared statement of Institute 
for Justice, Arlington, Va.). 
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 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 146-48 (prepared statement of Sumner Trousdale 
Opposing Pipeline, Tenn.). 
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 Id. at 73-74 (testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of 
Law, Arlington, Va.) (stating that condemning authorities frequently mischaracterize eminent 
domain for economic development purposes as economic development for blight remediation 
purposes); see, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 92-93 (prepared statement of Scott A. 
Mahan, Ardmore, Pa.) (reporting that Ardmore was not blighted when the takings occurred); 
id. at 76 (email from Donald J. Umhoefer of Menomonee Falls, WI) (reporting village’s use of 
dubious blight designation to threaten eminent domain in furtherance of economic 
development); id. at 64 (prepared statement of Dr. Eni Foo, Ardmore, Pa.) (reporting that ULI 
study recommending historic preservation rather than eminent domain caused township 
officials to rush through a blight designation for the area “using a very vague definition and 
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It is tempting to suggest a ban on Berman-style blight-remediation takings as 
well as Kelo-style economic-redevelopment takings.383  But it is very hard to develop 
a principled ground on which to reject these sorts of public-purpose takings that does 
not undermine the Court’s justification for economic-growth takings such as in the 
irrigation, hydroelectricity, and mining cases.  Justice Peckham approved public-
purpose takings to support growth, explicitly conflating “public use” with “public 
purpose” and “public interest.”384  Even admitting the shakiness of Bradley’s 
doctrinal foundation, a century of precedent is a lot to uproot in a legal system that 
values stare decisis.  And limited government—despite its analytical 
seductiveness—may not be a sufficiently compelling objective to justify forgoing 
economic growth.  Fortunately, we can split the horns of these jurisprudential and 
policy dilemmas by correcting the ways in which the law calculates just 
compensation.385  Instead of confining municipal bullying to a few hard-to-define 
contexts, it makes more sense to develop an approach to eminent domain that 
substantially removes the bullying behavior in all cases. 
B. The Political Utility of Smart-Decline Takings 
The rhetoric of property-rights advocates evokes deep strands of American myth 
that spring from the pro-growth mentality of fee simple empire.  Consider this 
passage from Ms. Berliner: 
                                                          
legal loophole.  Anyone in its rightful [sic] mind would not believe that Ardmore was 
‘Blighted’”); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 138 (testimony of John Seravalli, Daytona Beach, 
Fla.) (complaining that St. Louis, Mo. designated apartment buildings as blighted on 
questionable grounds with the collusion of the building owners so as to permit condemnation 
of the buildings and the underlying land followed by redevelopment of the properties by the 
building owners); id. at 137 (testimony of  Daniel P. Regenold, Cincinnati, Ohio) (reporting 
that Evendale, Ohio obtained questionable blight designation so that it could use the threat of 
eminent domain as negotiating leverage during its land assembly process); id. at 126 
(testimony of Gopal K. Panday of Long Branch, N.J.) (arguing that city’s blight designation is 
a falsehood designed to transfer private property to the hands of a favored developer); id. at 
124 (letter from Barbara J. Morley, Lincoln, Neb.) (describing abusive blight designations in 
Lincoln, Neb. involving manipulating the boundary of a redevelopment area to affect the 
admixture of blighted and non-blighted properties and noting that one such charade resulted in 
a “blighted area” that included Warren Buffett’s home); id. at 77 (statement of Don & Lynn 
Farris, Lakewood, Ohio) (reporting that Lakewood, Ohio homes were considered blighted for 
lack of two-car attached garages, two full bathrooms, central air, and other upscale amenities); 
id. at 7 (statement of Susette Kelo, New London, Conn.) (“My neighborhood was not 
blighted; it was a nice neighborhood where people were close.”). 
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 Compare H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 114 (prepared statement of Dr. Roger Pilon, 
Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that allowing blight-remediation takings 
unjustifiably expands government power), with id. at 51 (testimony of Dana Berliner, Institute 
for Justice, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that Kelo-style “eminent domain for private parties” 
will spawn “infinitely more abuse”). 
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 See generally Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 12, 158-61 (1896). 
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 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 20 (testimony of Prof. Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia 
University School of Law, New York, N.Y.) (arguing that Congress can legislate on the 
meaning of just compensation under its Section 5 powers granted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
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Eminent domain sounds like an abstract issue, but it affects real people.  
Real people lose the homes they love and watch as they are replaced with 
condominiums.  Real people lose the businesses that they count on to put 
food on the table and watch as they are replaced with shopping malls.  
And all this happens because localities find condos and malls preferable 
to modest homes and small businesses. . . . Using eminent domain so that 
another, richer, better-connected person may live or work on the land you 
used to own tells Americans that their hopes, dreams and hard work do 
not matter as much as money and political influence.  The use of eminent 
domain for private development has no place in a country built on 
traditions of independence, hard work, and the protection of property 
rights.386 
The government’s tendency to inadequately define the social benefits of 
economic-development takings provides great latitude for emotionally compelling 
stories to contradict the economic efficiency of the taking.  The empirically rigorous 
justification for smart-decline takings clears the field of overheated rhetoric and 
allows for an honest assessment of the issues involved.  By short-circuiting the 
rhetoric while presenting the same property-rights claims from the affected 
individual owners, smart-decline takings enable a look past the rhetoric to the 
underlying legal issues.   
For decades, conservatives have argued that nuisance law can address urban 
blight.  With some modernizing adjustments—such as community-based 
receivership actions to remove spot blight in viable neighborhoods and land banking 
for communities with broad redevelopment needs and foreseeable demand for urban 
land—nuisance law can likely do much of the job.387  But in cities that have lost a 
huge proportion of their population—such as Cleveland, Detroit, Buffalo, and other 
vertical cities—even land banking cannot offset the city’s excess infrastructure-
maintenance and service-delivery costs.  Eminent-domain opponents miss a valuable 
opportunity to curtail abusive government takings when they neglect to challenge 
municipal pursuit of an unrealistically nostalgic growth agenda.388   
Smart-decline takings resonate with conservative arguments for smaller 
government.  Wholesale decommissioning, by shrinking the city’s infrastructure 
footprint, necessarily reduces the scope of the local government.  Eminent domain 
assists wholesale-decommissioning efforts by unequivocally extinguishing private 
property rights.  Smart-decline takings are validated by a rigorously empirical 
justification of demonstrated cost savings for the public and improved opportunities 
for the individual.  Wholesale decommissioning also eliminates public subsidy of 
terminally defunct neighborhoods.  Unlike the present economic-development shell 
games decried by Professor Eagle, smart decline helps balance the municipal budget 
without imposing external costs on other jurisdictions.  By addressing the fiscal 
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 For an example of a property rights advocate showing deference to the prevailing pro-
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mismatch, smart-decline takings also offer at least the prospect of tax reductions—
another conservative touchstone—without compromising service quality.  For all of 
these reasons, smart-decline takings are more likely to win conservative support than 
conventional economic-development takings. 
In another reversal of traditional roles in the eminent-domain debate, the 
strongest resistance to the wholesale decommissioning of desolate neighborhoods 
may come from liberals concerned about government desertion of urbanites 
grappling with already tenuous circumstances.  For instance, Mr. Shelton contended 
that: 
[T]o the extent that such exercise of the takings power is more likely to 
occur in areas with significant racial and ethnic minority populations, and 
even assuming a proper motive on the part of government, the effect will 
likely be to upset organized minority communities.   
 
This dispersion both eliminates established community support 
mechanisms and has a deleterious effect on those groups’ ability to 
exercise what little political power they may have established.389   
In contexts where conditions warrant wholesale decommissioning, population 
densities are so low that any discussion of existing community-support mechanisms 
or local political power becomes macabre. 
Viewed more closely, smart-decline takings provide individual owners stranded 
in economic isolation through no fault of their own with a way out by giving them 
financial value in exchange for their ownership interests.  Genuine compensation 
reform gives good-faith owners a real opportunity for a richer community life 
elsewhere in the city.  For those owners who profess a preference for the isolated 
lifestyle prevalent in barren urban neighborhoods, appropriate levels of 
compensation will enable them to move to a truly rural environment.  With proper 
remuneration restoring much of the individual agency lost through the compulsory 
purchase, just compensation will ameliorate liberals’ social-justice concerns about 
smart-decline takings. 
The Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency standard, when combined with just-compensation 
reform, will also remedy a common problem: municipalities frequently use eminent 
domain to cover up their incompetence as assemblers of land.390  Watching 
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Colored People, Washington, D.C.) (emphasis added). 
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 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 144 (prepared statement of Elaine J. Mittleman, Falls 
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documentary interviews of the parties in Kelo taken after the Supreme Court’s 
decision, it is impossible to ignore the cocksure and even entitled demeanor of the 
individuals working for the government.391  On the other side, Susette Kelo’s 
bellicose tone conveys the impression of someone provoked into fighting as much 
for its own sake as for any deep-seated philosophical objections.  Ms. Kelo learned 
of the city’s plans to seize her home through her local newspaper rather than a 
respectful face-to-face conversation with a city employee.  Noting this public-
relations blunder and the contemptuous self-assurance of the city employees 
interviewed, one has to wonder if New London could have avoided the litigation 
entirely with a more tactful negotiating approach.   
Consider also Mr. Cristofaro’s description of New London’s blundering 
approach to acquiring his parents’ second home after taking his parents’ first home 
by eminent domain for a sea wall that was never built: 
Nevertheless, when the Fort Trumbull development was proposed, no one 
from the city even bothered to come and talk to him.  Now, he’s from the 
old country.  He just wants to be treated like an individual, with some 
human dignity.  Instead, they came with harassments, intimidations, and 
just outright threats.392 
The fact that the elder Mr. Cristofaro was a retired city employee with twenty-
seven years of service compounded the insult.393  Surely someone in city government 
had a relationship with this former employee that might have led to a consensual 
sale. 
Contrast New London’s approach with Representative Trent Franks’ story of an 
enlightened public official’s avoidance of eminent domain through adroit 
negotiations.  In a case involving public land assembly for an impending dam 
construction project, one owner rebuffed repeated envoys offering to purchase his 
property.394  Eventually, the project director personally visited the man and asked 
                                                          
Bernwell, St. Louis, Mo.) (decrying wastefulness of Rock Hill, Mo. eminent-domain action); 
id. at 63 (prepared statement of Dr. Eni Foo, Ardmore, Pa.) (describing township letter to 
longtime local business owners informing them of imminent arrival of appraiser to determine 
condemnation value of property and summoning them to appear before a township official to 
be told their rights); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 9 (statement of Rev. Fred Jenkins, N. 
Hempstead, N.Y.)  (reporting that N. Hempstead allowed his congregation’s building permit 
application to remain pending for roughly eighteen months while failing to inform 
congregation of town’s plans to condemn partially built church that congregation had 
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why he would not sell. 395  Recounting the private owner’s reply, Representative 
Franks said: 
[The property owner] said my mother was born in that back room.  He 
says my grandfather homesteaded this property, and I was born there, and 
my grandfather, when he built this place and built that hearth, he lit the 
fire, and it hasn’t gone out since.  And it’s not going out on my watch.   
 
Sometimes we fail to remember that there’s more than just economic 
considerations in people’s concern for their property. 
 
Now, I understand the way that they resolved that was that they paid him 
for the house, and they picked the entire thing up and left the fire burning 
and moved it to a place that was acceptable to him.396 
One striking aspect of the eminent-domain debate is that one of the most active 
opponents of eminent-domain abuse, the Institute for Justice, has given very little 
thought to compensation reform.  Before the House Subcommittee, Ms. Berliner 
said, “[J]ust compensation is not our main area.  In general it’s important that people 
be left in a position that’s not worse than the one they started in.  But beyond that, 
the technicalities of how to put that together is something we could discuss.  It’s a 
complicated issue.”397  Does the property-rights movement’s neglect of 
compensation reform blind them to a market-based solution to eminent-domain 
abuse?  The prospect of just compensation—coupled with the transaction costs of the 
condemnation proceeding itself—made it worthwhile for Senator Franks’ 
hydroelectric power administrator to move the hearth-tender’s house.  Including the 
dollar value of the unextinguished hearth fire in the homeowner’s just compensation 
would harness the power of the free market, another conservative panacea, to curb 
governmental enthusiasm for eminent domain without banning outright this 
occasionally legitimate tool. 
Holding cities to the same standard of competence as private developers by 
making their land-assembly successes more dependent upon their aptitude in 
negotiating at voluntary prices may result in many cities exiting the land-
development game entirely.  This might not be a bad thing.  Instead of spending 
public dollars rearranging title to existing landed assets, cities might deploy their 
economic-development budgets to support local entrepreneurship, improve 
educational opportunities, reduce the local tax burden, or otherwise generate new 
wealth for citizens.398  A shift to wealth-creation strategies rather than land-
redistribution strategies, while perhaps more difficult for public officials, also 
reduces the frequency of eminent-domain proceedings’ inherent governmental 
conflict of interest.   
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By increasing compensation protections without completely barring public-
purpose takings, sensible eminent domain reform would still allow local 
governments to catalyze private land development in their jurisdiction.  For example, 
municipal government could provide funding assistance to developers negotiating 
with high-compensation sellers.  Cities could mitigate developers’ assembly-failure 
risk by offering developers an opportunity to “put” partially assembled projects to 
the city’s land bank at a modest discount from objective fair market value.  As a last 
resort, the government could still employ eminent domain when the owner’s 
insistence on a clearly unreasonable valuation threatened a project with substantial 
verifiable positive externalities. 
C. Identification and Resolution of the Dispositive Legal Issues 
Having removed distracting symbolic appeals from the discourse and given all 
sides reasons to renew the dialogue about eminent domain, an opportunity arises for 
genuine resolution of the two legitimate issues driving Americans’ concerns about 
governmental takings.  First, Americans want to know that they are being treated 
fairly by their government, and adequate compensation for the seizure of property is 
essential to that impression of fairness.  Viewed in this light, a person denied access 
to adequate compensation by insufficient process is actually making an insufficient-
compensation objection.  Second, Americans want to know that their government is 
not compelling them to bargain away their land for frivolous, uncertain, or nefarious 
reasons. 
1. Fair Remuneration for the Property Owner 
Commentators almost always discuss condemnation’s harm to individual owners 
in terms of the monetary award’s failure to compensate for the owner’s loss.399  In 
the most easily corrected cases, owners receive an insufficient dollar value for their 
properties’ objective fair market values.  The discrepancy might emerge because the 
government’s threat of eminent domain artificially depresses the owners’ selling 
prices.400  Alternatively, the government’s demolition or neglect of nearby structures 
                                                          
 
399
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 98 (email from Andrina Sofos, Daly City, Cal.) 
(admitting that she would not be objecting if the government paid “the right price” for her 
commercial property). 
 
400
 See, e.g., id. at 131 (letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New London, Conn.) (reporting 
harassment by brokers threatening eminent domain if he did not agree to sell his home); id. at 
100 (letter from Carl & Arleen Yacobacci, Derby, Conn.) (reporting threat of eminent domain 
in concert with developer’s bid for roughly half of privately-appraised value); id. at 78 (email 
from Gail Hunter, Midwest City, Okla.) (reporting capitulation to a “voluntary” sale after 
repeated threats that she would get less if she forced the city to condemn her home because of 
the asserted likelihood of the three appraisers “to side with the city”); id. at 77 (email from 
Nick Ericson, Duluth, Minn.) (reporting condemnation for less value of property listed for 
sale); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 137 (testimony of Daniel P. Regenold, Cincinnati, Ohio) 
(reporting that Evendale, Ohio obtained questionable blight designation so that it could use the 
threat of eminent domain as negotiating leverage during its land-assembly process); id. at 79 
(statement of Dan Freier, Minneapolis, Minn.) (reporting that developer made a “low ball 
offer” for his apartment building and a concurrent threat of eminent domain if he didn’t accept 
the offer). 
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often detracts from the appraised value of the owners’ properties.401  In the most 
egregious cases, the government actively obstructs the private owners’ efforts to 
obtain full value for their properties.402  Disagreement about price is intrinsic to all 
compulsory purchase actions.  Courts can readily resolve disputes about objective 
value by using familiar techniques of administrative review. 
Some critics argue that the real harm of a public-purpose taking is the loss of the 
owner’s idiosyncratic interest in the property.403  Admittedly, subjective-value claims 
                                                          
 
401
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 131 (letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New London, 
Conn.) (reporting negative effect of city’s neglect of already-assembled properties on 
homeowner’s appraisal); id. at 100 (letter from Carl & Arleen Yacobacci, Derby, Conn.) 
(reporting that the government allowed city-owned buildings to deteriorate, including partial 
demolitions, one building’s roof collapsing, and the establishment of a semi-permanent 
construction zone on Main Street to the detriment of remaining businesses, so as to lower the 
value of the privately held property in the area). 
 
402
 See, e.g., id. at 131 (letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New London, Conn.) (reporting 
negative effect of city’s destructive asbestos sampling on homeowner’s appraisal); id. at 131-
32 (letter, Thomas Picinich, New London, Conn.) (reporting valuation of properties using 
distant comparables rather than prices paid in adjacent voluntary sales for the same land-
assembly project, resulting in a downward shift in appraised value from $230,000 to 
$130,000); id. at 74-75 (email from Gylbert Coker, New York City, N.Y.) (expressing 
frustration with his mother’s inability to collect the compensation owed to her by New York 
City for a condemnation of her Harlem property in 1990 and indicating that his family 
endured a similar struggle to collect compensation in the 1940s for condemned property in 
Florida); id. at 73 (prepared statement of Cristina Huerta Rodriguez, Ogden, Utah) (describing 
discrepancy between appraised land value for condemned property at $2.15/sf, Wal-Mart’s 
alleged willingness to pay $7.00/sf, and comparable vacant commercial land selling for 
$14.00/sf in the vicinity); id. at 72 (prepared statement of Cristina Huerta Rodriguez, Ogden, 
Utah) (describing low valuations received from city appraisers and improperly-performed 
reappraisal after she challenged the initial valuations). 
 
403
 POSNER, supra note 357, at 56; see also S. Hearings, note 63, at 30 (written response of 
Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va. to a question 
submitted by Sen. John Cornyn, Tex.) (noting that non-consensual property sales are not self-
justifying); see, e.g., H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 113 (letter from Thomas J. Picinich, New 
London, Conn.) (reporting expropriation despite investment of time and money restoring 
home); id. at 63 (prepared statement of Dr. Eni Foo, Ardmore, Pa.) (reporting intended 
reliance on condemned restaurant business for retirement income);  id. at 42 (testimony of 
Hilary O. Shelton, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington, 
D.C.) (emphasizing that compensation, to be adequate, must account for the vital importance 
of social networks on the lives of poor people because of their greater propensity to barter for 
services such as babysitting or meeting a repairman at the residence); id. at 22-23 (testimony 
of Michael Cristofaro, New London, Conn.) (describing his parents’ immigration from Italy, 
purchase of a home, installation of gardens and vineyard, taking of that home by New London 
by eminent domain for a sea wall that was never built, purchase of another home, brother’s 
return to the second home with wife and children to be closer to the grandparents after twenty 
years in the Air Force, and New London’s taking of that second home by eminent domain for 
the Pfizer project); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 42 (testimony of Robert Blue, Hollywood, 
Cal.) (describing the importance of location to his three-generation family business in Los 
Angeles, Cal., saying, “We have many returning customers who remember our location more 
than our name—they remember the luggage store ‘near the corner of Hollywood and Vine’”); 
id. at 29 (written response of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason University School of Law, 
Arlington, Va. to a question submitted by Sen. John Cornyn, Tex.) (arguing that an 
individual’s home or business serves as a “center of family life, a repository of individual 
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will occasionally present thorny valuation issues.  In some relatively straightforward 
cases, the legally-defined scope of just compensation omits verifiable situation-
specific costs such as relocation expenses404 or the loss of a favorable lease.405  
                                                          
memories, and an extension of the owner’s personality” as well as a financial asset); id. at 25 
(testimony of Sen. Sam Brownback, Kan.) (noting that, for many farmers, their land may only 
be worth a relatively small amount used as a farm, but it is an integral part of who they are and 
they may be adamantly opposed to selling it); id. at 15 (statement of Prof. Thomas W. Merrill, 
Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y.) (noting that people have “important 
aspects of their personal identity invested” in their property); id. 13, 19 (statement and 
testimony of Hilary O. Shelton, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
Washington, D.C.) (emphasizing that compensation, to be adequate, must account for the vital 
importance of social networks on the lives of poor people because of their greater propensity 
to barter for services such as babysitting or meeting a repairman at the residence); id. at 8-9 
(statement of Pastor Fred Jenkins, North Hempstead, N.Y.) (describing investments of time 
and money by N. Hempstead, N.Y. church congregation to purchase land and partially-
constructed church, clear the site of debris, obtain construction financing, and apply for 
building permits before losing the property through eminent domain); id. at 7 (statement of 
Susette Kelo, New London, Conn.) (describing improvements and personalizing touches she 
made to her home). 
 
404
 S. Hearings, note 63, at 13 (statement of Hilary O. Shelton, National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, Washington, D.C.) (“In fact, one study from the mid-1980s 
showed that 86 percent of those relocated by an exercise of eminent domain power were 
paying more rent at their new residence, with the median rent almost doubling.”); see also H. 
Hearings, supra note 25, at 146 (prepared statement of Elaine J. Mittleman, Falls Church, 
Va.) (discussing inadequacy of Uniform Relocation Act’s statutory compensation for business 
relocation expenses and the special hardship that relocated small businesses experience in 
trying to adjust to doing business in a new location); id. at 102 (email from Brian Calvert, 
Derby, Conn.) (noting that business owner would be amenable to relocate if able to replicate 
his current operating environment, but city-developer partnership has only offered “a 
pittance”); id. at 100-01 (letter from Carl & Arleen Yacobacci, Derby, Conn.) (describing 
inability to relocate their business with the funds that they expect to receive as compensation 
for the taking of their current premises and perfunctory relocation assistance from city 
officials); id. at 97 (email from Andrina Sofos, Daly City, Cal.) (describing lack of 
compensation for capital expenditures to bring commercial property into compliance with 
environmental regulations); id. at 75 (email from John Geither, Shawnee, Kan.) (reporting 
receipt of only 20% of his sandwich shop’s relocation costs, despite eighteen months 
remaining on lease); id. at 72 (prepared statement of Cristina Huerta Rodriguez, Ogden, Utah) 
(describing improvements and personalizing touches added to their home that were 
disregarded by the relocation specialist assigned to their case as not pertinent to the 
compensation formula); id. at 71 (email from John & Barbara Bernwell, St. Louis, Mo.) 
(decrying unfairness of Rock Hill, Mo. eminent domain action to take their home when they 
have invested hard work and money to render the home suitable for them to age in place, 
especially the handicapped husband); id. at 68 (prepared statement of Ken Taylor, Wayne, 
Pa.) (attributing “steady reduction in affordable housing and shopping” in Ardmore, Pa., area 
to eminent domain’s elimination of lower-rent residential and commercial structures); id. at 63 
(email from Jim Campano, Somerville, Mass.) (recounting 1958 use of eminent domain 
during the urban renewal era to destroy a viable low-cost urban village in the West End of 
Boston). 
 
405
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 75 (email from John Geither, Shawnee, Kan.) (reporting 
a year of lost business before reopening sandwich shop in new location); id. at 4 (testimony of 
Rep. Jerrold Nadler, N.Y.) (noting that renters do not receive compensation for the loss of 
their leasehold interest); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 127 (statement of Daryl Penner, 
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Simply expanding the definition of just compensation to include reasonable 
idiosyncratic value will allow affected owners an opportunity to prove and recover 
these losses.  Cases where the land itself has idiosyncratic value are harder to 
monetize.  While many owners view urban land as a fungible commodity, 
undercompensation of those owners who have genuine subjective reasons to value 
their property in excess of the fair-market price violates our sense of fairness.   
The additional valuation can derive from many sources.  An elderly resident may 
have raised his family in a home now surrounded by desolation.  A business owner’s 
custom improvements to her real property may be vital to her operations, may retain 
little resale value, and may be cost-prohibitive to relocate.  A church’s proximity to 
convenient arterial roadways may play a major part in filling the sanctuary on 
Sundays.   
Eminent-domain opponents argue, however, that courts cannot determine the 
appropriate level of additional compensation in these situations.406  Professor Eagle 
argued that an accurate valuation of costs and benefits related to eminent domain is 
not possible, saying, “Since there is no way to determine how much the condemnee 
really values his or her residence or business parcel, and since subsidies are 
convoluted, there is no way to be sure that condemnation and retransfer to private 
developers adds to, or subtracts from, society’s welfare.”407  Senator Jon Kyl went so 
far as to say that just compensation cannot possibly offset the owner’s loss, saying, 
“[W]hen you say at least you get paid in condemnation, . . . my response is [that] it is 
like the old thing, [‘W]ell, other than that Mrs. Lincoln, how did you like the 
play?[’]  It is not exactly a good result.  It is still taken from you.”408   
This interest, however, can be monetized in any number of ways.409  Courts 
routinely make equitable-compensation awards in other kinds of cases, even in 
wrongful death claims.410  It is unreasonable to contend that property losses are less 
                                                          
Kansas City, Mo.) (decrying condemnation of 70-year-old tuxedo-rental store with large 
downtown clientele and significant square footage without adequate compensation to reflect 
the prime location, resulting in the inability to rent in the new development or obtain premises 
nearby); id. at 79 (statement of Dan Freier, Minneapolis, Minn.) (noting that renters of 
affordable units in his condemned apartment building will have difficulty finding comparably 
priced accommodations and that the compensation they will receive will not offset the higher 
rents they will likely have to pay). 
 
406
 See generally Barros, supra note 25. 
 
407
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 71 (testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.). 
 
408
 Id. at 27 (testimony of Sen. Jon Kyl, Ariz.). 
 
409
 H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 143 (prepared statement of Elaine J. Mittleman, Falls 
Church, Va.) (arguing that current compensation processes grant an inappropriate land 
assembly windfall to the end user); S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 122 (testimony Prof. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y.) (suggesting a 
compensation premium of one percent above fair market value for each year of continuous 
occupancy and a mechanism for distributing some of the land-assembly windfall to the 
dispossessed prior owners); id. at 73-74 (testimony of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George Mason 
University School of Law, Arlington, Va.) (arguing that persons dispossessed be allowed to 
“participate” in the redevelopment project).  
 
410
 See, e.g., Credit Bureau Enters., Inc. v. Pelo, 608 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 2000) (comparing to 
unjust enrichment). 
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amenable to valuation than the loss of life itself.  The fact-finder can determine the 
propriety of heightened compensation by the usual inquiry into the particular 
circumstances of each case through the adversary system.  Courts can also employ 
the techniques used to monetize tort awards to establish the appropriate dollar 
amount of additional compensation above fair market value to reflect the nature and 
duration of the affected owner’s subjective investment.411  After a relatively small 
number of test cases, most disputes about proper compensation will be settled, thus 
mitigating any drain on judicial resources threatened by this approach. 
Opponents might object that raising compensation awards to reflect idiosyncratic 
value will hinder the land assembly necessary for patently public uses such as roads 
and firehouses.  The riposte to this argument is that the harm to the dispossessed 
owner is the same regardless of society’s subsequent use of the property.  If that 
subsequent use is sufficiently necessary to justify truncating the individual’s 
property interests, then the resulting economic gain should be sufficient to fully 
offset the owner’s loss. 
Professor Eagle argued that idiosyncratic value creates a moral problem in 
eminent-domain cases, stating, “While owners typically are described as greedy 
holdouts, their unwillingness to sell often is based on their special attachment to the 
land resulting from sentimental reasons or the economic value derived from good 
will or customization of the land or building to suit their particular business 
needs.”412  But most sentimental value and all customization expenses can be 
compensated for with money.  Any argument that attacks public-purpose takings 
because the dispossessed owner’s loss ostensibly cannot be fully monetized is 
overbroad.  The Fifth Amendment plainly contemplates monetary compensation for 
direct-government-use and common-carrier takings.  To argue that Susette Kelo’s 
loss cannot be monetized while Stanford Cramer’s,413 Mark Bryant’s,414 or Darryl 
Penner’s415 can is to sketch a distinction that cannot be sustained.   
For most urban real estate parcels, the assertion that no amount of money can 
compensate an owner for his or hers involuntary sale is specious.  At some dollar 
value, whatever elements are idiosyncratically compelling about the location can be 
recreated or transplanted.  Consider this exchange before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: 
Chairman Specter.  Ms. Kelo, do you have a personal identity with your 
property; that is to say, will money compensate for the taking, as you see 
it, having been so close to it for so long?   
 
Ms. Kelo.  There are things that you can’t— 
Chairman Specter.  Is money enough to take your property, Ms. Kelo? 
                                                          
 
411
 See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 6 (D. Ariz. 1979) (establishing an award 
by examining the valuation of harm). 
 
412
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 31 (written response of Prof. Steven J. Eagle, George 
Mason University School of Law, Arlington, Va. to a question submitted by Sen. John 
Cornyn, Tex.). 
 
413
 See supra text accompanying notes 370-73 (explaining direct-government-use taking). 
 
414
 See supra text accompanying note 376 (explaining common-carrier taking). 
 
415
 See supra text accompanying notes 374-75 (explaining blight-remediation taking). 
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Ms. Kelo.  No.  There are some things that you just can’t put a price on, 
sir. 
 
Chairman Specter.  Pastor Jenkins, is money sufficient to take your 
church? 
 
Rev. Jenkins.  Well, our property was not for sale and money cannot 
really pay back what we lost.416 
Can it really be said that these two owners, each of whose connection to the 
property existed for less than a decade, have such a fundamental attachment to the 
land that no amount of money would suffice to compensate them for its idiosyncratic 
value in their perspective?   
At some dollar figure, the compensation would be sufficient to move the building 
itself.  A large enough sum would enable Ms. Kelo to buy one of the planned new 
condos while living in a luxury hotel downtown or a bed-and-breakfast on the coast 
until the developer completed construction.  At some level of compensation, Pastor 
Jenkins’ congregation could recover its investment in the condemned property, buy 
and clear some other existing parcels, pay for any consultants or lobbyists needed to 
obtain building permits, and construct a new church.  While the individual owner’s 
legitimate interests in the property might not represent enough financial value to 
permit any of these specific outcomes, it is spurious to suggest that the monetary 
equivalent of those aggregated interests is an infinite number of dollars. 
The implication is that the right to wealth stability is a basic value.  When people 
say “property rights,” they mean, in large part, the right to gain value from their land.  
The argument is that eminent domain threatens the American Dream, perhaps 
reasonably summarized as middle-class wealth creation through homeownership.  
Property creates wealth because it has value that appreciates and it can be leased or 
sold to realize that value increase.  Choosing when to realize that value, and at what 
price, is central to the endeavor.  When owners are in extreme geographic isolation 
in a formerly urban environment, they really ought to move, for their own benefit as 
well as that of the community.  Inner-city homeowners may actually wish to be taken 
out of title,417 but they face an irredeemably depressed value for their home—often 
their most significant financial asset—and almost complete illiquidity in the home-
sale market.  When accompanied by compensation sufficient to allow such residents 
to relocate to safe, affordable housing in a more vibrant neighborhood, smart-decline 
takings do not impose significant harms on these isolated inner-city residents.   
2. A Legitimate Boon to Society 
Defining the public-use requirement as the generation of a widely distributed 
positive externality is more likely to limit eminent-domain abuse than any effort to 
                                                          
 
416
 S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 19-20 (testimony of Susette Kelo, New London, Conn. & 
Rev. Fred Jenkins, N. Hempstead, N.Y.). 
 
417
 See, e.g., Perkins & Breckenridge, supra note 12; David Runk, Detroit Wants to Save 
Itself by Shrinking, ASSOCIATED PRESS FINANCIAL WIRE (Mar. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/08/detroit-wants-to-save-its_n_490680.html (last 
visited April 10, 2010). 
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classify some such public goods as constitutional and others unconstitutional.418  A 
person adequately compensated in the process of an inefficient project (one not 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient and, therefore, not a public use) does not complain as a 
property owner; rather, he or she complains—as we all should—as a taxpayer.  And 
his or hers complaint is not that his or hers rights to use and alienate Blackacre are 
being trampled upon, but rather that his or hers tax dollars are being squandered.   
But the fairness claims of individual owners to compensation for subjective value 
are in tension with the social-utility claims of the remainder of the community to 
efficient public services.  The conflict can best be resolved by heightened 
compensation awards,419 as illustrated by a consideration of the various options 
available in the Rawlsian original position.420  Philosopher John Rawls suggested 
that rights are distributed justly in a given political system if we would vouch for the 
fairness of that distribution before we knew our social position in that system.421  
Using this approach, property rights are justly distributed if we would find that their 
arrangement properly balances the competing interests of individual owners and the 
public at large.  But we need to make this determination independent of our status as 
an individual owner subject to condemnation, an employee of the condemning 
authority, or an interested third-party taxpayer. 
Let us assume that it would be highly beneficial to the city budget to force 
holdout owners to leave the most severely affected neighborhood in a vacant vertical 
city.  There are two scenarios under current law: 
If the law prohibits the use of eminent domain to remove unwilling 
sellers, the law leaves the recalcitrant owner in increasing isolation 
holding real estate assets that continue to plummet in value.  The 
community-at-large must continue to bear the inefficiency costs of 
providing basic municipal services to that address.   
 
If the law permits the use of eminent domain and requires the condemning 
authority to provide only conventional fair-market compensation, the law 
punishes the dispossessed owner for her stewardship of the property 
during the period of neighborhood decline by an inadequate recovery of 
her investment.  The law relieves the community of the externalities 
associated with vacancy, but the community reaps a windfall by forcing 
                                                          
 
418
 Compare H. Hearings, supra note 25, at 56 (prepared statement of Rep. John Conyers, 
Jr., Mich.) (arguing for restrictive categorization of certain specified outcomes as “public 
use”), with S. Hearings, supra note 63, at 15-16, 116-20 (testimony of Prof. Thomas W. 
Merrill, Columbia University School of Law, New York, N.Y.) (asserting the futility of any 
effort to draw such a bright-line rule in general terms). 
 
419
 See, e.g., Weiner, supra note 217, at 13 (describing Rhode Island’s choice to impose 
just-compensation minimum of 150% of fair market value for economic-development 
takings); see also Lawrence Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, & Perry Shapiro, The Taking of 
Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984) (advocating the view 
that just compensation be viewed as a form of publicly-administered condemnation 
insurance).   
 
420
 See MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 84-88 (2000); Michelman, 
supra note 31, at 1218-24.  
 
421
 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18-19 (1972). 
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the individual owner to sacrifice value that, while not marketable, 
resonates with reasonable understandings of economic loss. 
 
There is, however, a third option available to state lawmakers: 
If the law permits the taking, but requires the payment of heightened 
compensation, the law refunds the subjective costs incurred by the owner 
during her period of investment to her out of the social benefit (as 
represented by the tax revenue garnered from the community as a whole).  
If the municipal contraction plan does not make economic sense with the 
payment of heightened compensation, then the projected net social gain is 
not sufficient to justify dispossessing the owner who kept her faith with 
the city. 
This approach to the conflict between individual property rights and collective 
social benefit in the eminent-domain context reframes the problem as one of 
reciprocal rights.422  Individual owners have a right to their idiosyncratic preferences 
for discrete pieces of land.  Other city taxpayers have a right to the efficient 
provision of city services.  According to the Coase theorem, the legal assignment of 
a right is irrelevant if transaction costs are low.423  Denying the power of eminent 
domain gives the individual owner an irrevocable veto, exercised by simply naming 
a price beyond the efficiency gain to the city.  While the appropriate level of 
compensation is critical to preserving the bargaining strength of the individual 
owner, eminent domain itself is necessary to compel the negotiation.424 
Professor Hicks himself noted that “[t]he main practical advantage of our line of 
approach is that it fixes attention upon the question of compensation.”425  Hicks also 
acknowledged that the question of which situations deserve compensation is not a 
matter for economic science, but rather a question based on personal value 
judgments.426  The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution 
require compensation in eminent-domain proceedings.  And the personal value 
judgments that determine the amount of compensation ought to be those of the 
community at large, as represented by the lay jury. 
Monetizing subjective value can be difficult in practice, but Professor Kaldor 
noted the importance of doing so in 1939.  In a comment readily applicable to the 
eminent-domain context, he said, “[I]ndividuals might, as a result of a certain 
political action, sustain losses of a non-pecuniary kind . . . [such as] in cases where 
individuals feel that the carrying out of the policy involves an interference with their 
individual freedom.”427  Professor Kaldor went on to note, “Only if the increase in 
total income is sufficient to compensate for such losses, and still leaves something 
                                                          
 
422
 For a general discussion of the economic consequences of reciprocal rights, see R. H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). 
 
423
 Id. 
 
424
 Id. at 16. 
 
425
 Hicks, supra note 85, at 711. 
 
426
 Id. at 711-12. 
 
427
 Kaldor, supra note 85, at 551 n.1. 
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over to the rest of the community, can [the political action] be said to be ‘justified’ 
without resort to interpersonal comparisons.”428 
The evaluation of an eminent-domain petition always involves a balancing of 
individual and communal interests.  When the economic benefits to the community 
as a whole significantly outweigh the harm to the dispossessed owner, federal courts 
have consistently found a public purpose and permitted the taking.429  When 
municipal economic conditions are dire and urban land markets have failed, the same 
sort of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency arguments justify smart-decline proposals.430  
Therefore, federal courts should permit takings for the public purpose of realizing an 
empirically supported comprehensive plan for municipal contraction. 
On its face, the proposal that a city should abandon some of its neighborhoods 
appears to contradict the growth emphasis in the Supreme Court’s public-purpose-
takings doctrine.  But smart decline resulting in a smaller city is predicated on the 
fact that the city is too big for the population that wants to live there.431  By 
shrinking, the city reduces the tax burden it imposes on its residents, increases its 
ability to provide government services, and ultimately ameliorates the dysfunctional 
impact that urban vacancy has on metropolitan society.432  Just as the recruitment of 
private investment to create quasi-public infrastructure serves a public purpose, the 
relocation of landowners to eliminate excess urban vacancy can yield significant 
public benefits. 
Economic vitality is the overarching goal of the public-purpose rationale.433  
When smart decline is as likely to revitalize the community as more conventional 
planning strategies, it would be nonsensical to declare growth-oriented takings valid 
public uses while rejecting smart-decline takings.  Attempts to grow the current 
population of older cities to a level commensurate with their existing infrastructure 
are unlikely to yield significant results because those historical population levels 
were unsustainable anomalies.434  In vacant cities, municipal contraction should 
predictably increase economic vitality by enabling municipalities to increase their 
regional competitiveness on taxes and services.435 
Furthermore, prospective estimates of the potential public benefit from 
conventional development projects are susceptible to exaggeration.436  The benefits 
of wholesale decommissioning are quantifiable with much greater precision because 
cities have ready access to their historical cost data regarding both service delivery 
and infrastructure maintenance.  When supported by appropriate proof of the 
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possible cost savings, municipal contraction will represent a far less speculative 
source of net social gain than many growth-oriented public-development plans.437 
Maximizing social utility in the difficult operating environment presented by 
vacant central cities improves the lives of citizens and empowers them to engage in 
the maintenance of the political and economic systems that ensure liberty.  
Municipal contraction supports this utility maximization by concentrating the city’s 
remaining energies in preparation for stable, efficient governance without precluding 
future development.  That public purpose is as essential as others that the Supreme 
Court has already endorsed.438   
Because it restores a sustainable relationship between the supply and demand for 
urban land, wholesale decommissioning of vacant urban neighborhoods should fall 
within the permissive federal doctrine of public-purpose takings.439  The 
philosophical rationale for municipal contraction contains compelling arguments for 
the use of eminent domain under state law, where the public-use requirement has 
recently been defined much more narrowly than in the federal context.  By 
highlighting the social utility of municipal contraction, proponents may convince 
states that eminent domain is an essential tool for revitalizing their outmoded urban 
centers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Eminent-domain opponents are correct to identify condemnation law as an area 
of American law rife with injustice.  Current doctrine allows local governments to 
run roughshod over the rights of ordinary Americans, but the locus of abuse is not 
the one that property rights advocates typically identify.  By attempting a categorical 
approach to the meaning of the public-use requirement, they render their argument 
both over inclusive and under inclusive.  Interpreting the public-use requirement as 
antithetical to all public-purpose takings unnecessarily forecloses the ability of the 
community to successfully complete essential projects—whether an irrigation 
network, a hydroelectric dam, or a wholesale decommissioning.  Simultaneously, 
property-rights advocates turn a deaf ear to owners victimized by equally coercive 
takings in furtherance of unnecessary or unfair highway and fuel-pipeline projects.  
Finally, coupling the categorical approach with the elusive definitional boundary of 
blight remediation provides disingenuous condemning authorities with a means of 
circumventing the public-use requirement altogether. 
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By conceding a Kaldor-Hicks-efficiency test for “public use” and focusing on 
obtaining more sensible compensation for affected property owners, property-rights 
advocates will more effectively forestall eminent-domain abuse.  A scheme that 
properly compensates dispossessed owners for their loss—and grants them the 
opportunity for case-specific redress through the courts—would most plainly reflect 
the full economic value of competing land uses.  By monetizing the idiosyncratic 
value of land to existing owners, compensation reform would more adequately 
remedy the harm caused in all eminent-domain cases.  Such reform would also 
reduce the frequency of eminent-domain actions by reducing the opportunity for 
windfall profits.  Ironically, resolving the compensation issue will reduce the 
frequency of takings by enabling courts to deploy free-market valuation principles to 
test whether public projects are truly justified on a cost/benefit analysis.   
Requiring compensation for good-faith subjective value also forces governments 
to either become more adept at the land-assembly process or exit the business.  
Limiting government land-development activities reduces the scope of the eminent-
domain power’s inherent governmental conflict of interest.  At the same time, 
preserving the power of eminent domain will prevent truly abusive holdout owners 
from thwarting public projects deemed essential by the land-use markets themselves.  
Governments cannot use eminent domain to unjustifiably speculate in urban land if 
they must convincingly demonstrate net social benefit after fair remuneration to the 
harmed owners.  And requiring that condemning authorities offer this evidence 
contemporaneously with the announcement of their redevelopment plan will save 
individual owners from years of indeterminacy in the shadow of a threatened 
condemnation.  Such a requirement will also encourage diligent economic analysis 
by planners, saving municipalities from squandering their scarce resources on 
marginal redevelopment concepts. 
Returning to the question posed at the outset of this Note, the law should allow 
shrinking cities—like Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Youngstown—to extinguish 
private title and shutter vacant neighborhoods through compulsory purchase.  Law is 
sometimes slow to embrace new thinking from other academic disciplines, but it is 
time that the law accepted the senescence of the vertical city.  But recognizing that 
such cities are no longer the dynamos they once were is not the same as admitting 
defeat.  The American city has proven wildly successful in redistributing wealth and 
opportunity to tremendous numbers of its former residents.  The onset of affluence 
enabled millions of Americans to improve their material circumstances by putting 
some distance between themselves and the discomfiting aspects of the urban 
experience.  While the resulting isolation of less affluent citizens in the urban core 
creates moral and policy challenges, the reality is that most people with the means to 
leave are unwilling to live in distressed central-city neighborhoods. 
Just as rational commercial landlords respond to adverse market conditions by 
reducing their gross leasable area to align supply with demand, cities should 
acknowledge the market evidence of their overcapacity and consolidate the 
municipal footprint.  Using eminent domain to contract municipal boundaries is 
good public policy.  Unlike the private landlord-tenant relationship, cities have a 
fiduciary obligation to their citizens to maximize the collective welfare.  This 
concern for the common good makes the case for urban geographic reorganization 
even more compelling than the strictly economic motivations that cities and 
landlords share.  A categorical definition of the public-use requirement, motivated by 
excessively ideological preconceptions about the meanings of property and growth 
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in the American experience, should not prevent cities from adopting smart decline as 
an overarching land-use strategy.   
Deannexation raises interesting local-government issues regarding the fate of the 
decommissioned land.  One issue is whether jurisdiction would revert to the county 
government, the state, or a special-purpose entity.  In states like Ohio, counties have 
jurisdiction over unincorporated townships, but the novel concept of a formerly 
incorporated township will likely require new legal structures.  A second major 
concern—assuming that one possible long-term outcome is the eventual sale of the 
deannexed property to a developer wishing to create a new, fiscally self-sufficient 
community—is the question of which government entity pockets the sale proceeds. 
Cities could retain jurisdiction over the decommissioned land, but a principal 
attraction of deannexation is the freedom from financial obligation that the city 
might obtain.  In this sense, municipal contraction provides central cities with unique 
access to a regional land-use and resource-management strategy.  Unlike multilateral 
efforts toward regionalism, relinquishing municipal jurisdiction empowers central 
cities to force the unwanted land onto the regional agenda.  Municipal contraction 
circumvents the principal obstacle to regionalism—the central city’s unattractiveness 
to the suburban electorate.  Thus, smart decline provides a fresh point of departure 
for conversations about regionalism as well.  To those who would object to unilateral 
central-city action here, the rebuttal might be that the suburban-zoning, school-
districting, and other decisions that dismembered the city were not taken collectively 
either.  And the reason central cities are in trouble is that former occupants opted to 
withdraw from urban life. 
The choice of millions of individual market actors to depart for the suburbs might 
suggest that central cities should be allowed to continue their freefall into 
decrepitude.  But, unlike a bankrupt corporation that can simply be liquidated, cities 
have a tangible reality.  The unavoidable persistence of the urban geography—in one 
form or another—suggests that healthy central cities are in the long-term interest of 
all members of a metropolitan region.  The economic vitality of central cities has a 
significant impact on the economic fortunes of their surrounding regions.  More 
importantly, further marginalization of central-city residents can only reinforce the 
culture of despair, incivility, and illegality gripping many urban neighborhoods.  
Abandoning children unlucky enough to be born into this environment is morally 
unacceptable.  And maybe, just maybe, by shrinking the scope of its obligations 
geographically, the city can do a better job of preparing these innocent victims of 
urban decline.  It is commonplace to say that we would move mountains for our 
children.  Collectively, are we willing to move one another toward that end? 
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